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A New Theory of the State Corporate
Income Tax: The State Corporate




Looking at state and local tax systems in particular, the tax system
of the United States is an embarrassment wrapped in inertia inside
thoughtlessness.' Our best theories of tax competition within a fed-
eral system indicate that subnational governments should compete
over tax rates, not tax bases,2 but state and local tax bases differ signif-
icantly, causing, among other problems, high transaction costs. Our
best theories of tax assignment give the (real) property tax a leading
role at the local level, but the local property tax has been in decline
for a century.3 Our best theories of the sales tax indicate that the
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I The original quote is Winston Churchill on Russia: "It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma ... " The Russian Enigma (BBC radio broadcast Oct. 1, 1939). The best
adaptation is Lisa Simpson on Nelson Muntz: "[A] riddle wrapped in an enigma wrapped
in a vest." The Simpsons: Lisa's Date with Density (Fox television broadcast Dec. 15,
1996). For a more prosaic account of the many grim analyses of state tax systems going
back decades, see generally David Brunori, State Tax Policy: A Political Perspective (3d
ed. 2011); Charles E. McLure Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local Taxes: And the Nutti-
ness of Responses Thereto, 25 St. Tax Notes 841 (Sept. 16, 2002).
2 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 975, 979-85 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Tax Assignment Problem: Ruminations on How
Theory and Practice Depend on History, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 339, 343-44, 352 (2001) (theory);
Richard A. Musgrave, Who Should Tax, Where, and What?, in Tax Assignment in Federal
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broader the sales tax base the better, but state sales tax bases are nar-
row, as they usually exclude services and intangibles, ever-growing
parts of our economy.4 Progressive income taxes, a big part of the tax
system of many states, tend to be more volatile because they raise so
much revenue from relatively few taxpayers.5 The classic solution to
the problem of revenue volatility is for states to maintain large rainy
day funds; they do not.6 State-level corporate income taxes (CITs)
generally are seen as a bad idea,7 and yet they are very common. And
this is on top of the more general critique of corporate taxes at any
level of government. 8
Countries 2, 12-13 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1983); John Joseph Wallis, A History of the
Property Tax in America, in Property Taxation and Local Government Finance 123, 124
fig.1 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 2001) (data); Eric M. Zolt, Inequality, Collective Action, and
Taxing and Spending Patterns of State and Local Governments, 62 Tax L. Rev. 445, 497
(2009) (data).
4 See, e.g., John L. Mikesell, Dynamic Patterns in State Sales Tax Structures: Tax Policy
Change and Convergence, 1979-2007, 51 St. Tax Notes 175, 185 (Jan. 19, 2009) ("[S]tates
have consistently narrowed the statutory coverage of their sales tax bases. The narrowing
is on average around 25 percent of the legal base in place in 1970."); Frank Shafroth, Weak
Legs of the Three-Legged Stool, 59 St. Tax Notes 983, 985 (Mar. 28, 2011); Kirk J. Stark,
The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 407, 430 (2010); see also Joseph
Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an
Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 1418 (2006) ("When we refer to an ideal, neutral,
or uniform consumption tax, we mean that the consumption tax is imposed at the same
rate on all consumption."). Note that the question of consumption versus income taxes is
"[p]erhaps the single most important tax policy decision," id. at 1414, and that the main
difference between the two systems involves the taxation of capital, id. at 1417, which is
what a corporate income tax, in part, does. Thus, one might think that a well-designed
sales tax, as a consumption tax, should replace the income tax. As it is, we have poorly-
designed sales (consumption) taxes. The perspective of this Article is that, paradoxically,
the two poorly-designed taxes, that is, retail sales and corporate income, can operate effi-
ciently as complements in taxing a broader consumption base.
5 David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Prob-
lem, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 785 (2010); Stark, note 4, at 422.
6 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Kirk J. Stark, Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing
State Budget Crises, 87 Ind. L.J. 599, 599, 601-02 (2012); David Gamage, Coping Through
California's Budget Crises in Light of Proposition 13 and California's Fiscal Constitution,
in After the Tax Revolt: California's Proposition 13 Turns 30, at 59-60 (Jack Citrin & Isaac
William Martin eds., 2009).
7 See generally discussion at Section III.D; see also Brunori, note 1, at 107-09; Kirk J.
Stark, The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Corporate Income Taxation, 23 St. Tax
Notes 775, 783 (Mar. 4, 2002).
8 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 1197-212, 1231-49 (2004) (summarizing standard justi-
fications for a corporate income tax and finding them wanting-then offering a new (and
controversial) justification); see also Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business
Income Tax 10-16, 20-25 (Hamilton Project & Brookings Inst., 2007), http://www.brook
ings.edu/research/papers/2007/06/corporatetaxes-kleinbard (critiquing current system of
capital taxation and offering provocative reform).
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This Article is about the state CIT, and its thesis is that despite the
state CIT's many weaknesses it is evolving into a more efficient tax.9
Before building it up however, it is useful to delve more deeply into its
flaws. State CIT collections are volatile and procyclical much like per-
sonal income taxes and sales taxes,10 contributing to the fiscal roller
coasters that states now embark on with alarming regularity. Indeed,
even as corporations have recently enjoyed strong profits, state CITs
have not increased collections in proportion, and so are not helping
states emerge from their budget holes. 1 Collecting nondisbursed cor-
porate profits is one of the primary traditional justifications for the
CIT.
Yet I argue that several reforms have made the tax better and, as a
component of state finances, it may be stabilizing as a small but im-
portant contributor to a highly imperfect system. Certainly the states
are in no financial position to abolish the CIT, whatever its warts.
This Article has three goals: First, to collect the good news about the
CIT. Second, to propose a theory explaining why the new CIT has
become a better tax. Third, on the basis of what has been done and
why it is positive, to recommend next steps.
The theoretical argument is that the new state CIT functions-or
can function-as a fallback consumption tax. The CIT taxes sales that
9 "Efficiency" is the traditional tax policy norm I am primarily concerned with here.
None of the recent changes (or changes I propose) to the CIT have a clear impact on
equity when one considers the uncertain incidence of the taxes under discussion in this
Article. See Subsection III.E.2. Even in theory, the consumption versus income tax de-
bate has very uncertain equity implications. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the
Consumption Tax, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 961, 1016 (1992) ("Of the three theories of fairness
implicit in the arguments for exempting the return to capital, none makes out a persuasive
case for a consumption tax over an income tax."). Some of the reforms I discuss may also
have (weak) administrability implications.
10 See, e.g., J. Fred Giertz, The Property Tax Bound, 59 Nat'l Tax J. 695, 700-01 (2006)
(showing that the CIT does not make it into an ideal portfolio of taxes for Illinois because
of low growth and high volatility); Andrew Phillips, Robert Cline, Thomas Neubig & Julia
Thayne, Total State and Local Business Tax Burden for 2010, 61 St. Tax Notes 835, 842
(Sept. 26, 2011) (noting the volatility of the CIT and also that CITs are not rebounding
with the economy because of loss carryovers). There is evidence that the CIT is not en-
tirely procyclical. Elliott Dubin, State Corporate Income Tax Bases in the Current Busi-
ness Cycle, 60 St. Tax Notes 569, 569, 571 (May 23, 2011); see also Thiess Buettner &
Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an Automatic Stabilizer 16-17
(CESIFO, Working Paper No. 2798, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1481140 (finding some evidence that the CIT functions as an automatic
stabilizer among profitable, but credit-constrained firms (note that this study was based on
a CIT rate of 38%, much higher than U.S. state CIT rates)).
11 See, e.g., Gary Cornia, Kelly D. Edmiston, David L. Sjoquist & Sally Wallace, The
Disappearing State Corporate Income Tax 44 fig.1 (Andrew Young Sch. of Pol'y Stud.,
Working Paper No. 06-27, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract
id=895140; David Reilly, U.S. Tax Haul Trails Profit Surge, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 2012, at C14;
Kevin Yamamura, California's Corporate Tax Collection Lags, Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28,
2011, at IA.
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are not taxed by traditional state retail sales taxes (RSTs). Most spe-
cifically, the new state CIT reaches the sale of many services and in-
tangibles; these transactions should be subject to the sales tax, but are
not. The new CIT taxes some of these sales, in effect broadening the
sales tax base in the manner indicated by tax theory. The CIT accom-
plishes this because the sales factor used to apportion CIT income
includes sales of services and intangibles.
Now, this reach of the CIT is both underinclusive and overinclusive.
For instance, in general the CIT-and its apportionment rules-only
reach corporations with net income.12 We pay sales tax on transac-
tions with noncorporate businesses, even those that are losing money,
because the sales tax is meant to be a tax on us as consumers and not
the selling entity. This fact indicates that the new CIT should be re-
formed to reach more kinds of businesses. At the same time, some
corporations, with net income, pay both the CIT and sell products on
which their customers pay sales tax-say a profitable corporate seller
of electronics. Thus, reforms also should look to minimizing the CIT
burden on entities that sell products already subject to the sales tax.
There is another reason that the reforms of the CIT put in place
over the last decades should spur more reforms in order to improve
the CIT in ways that, willy-nilly, also improve other state taxes. The
many recent reforms of the CIT indicate, tautologically, that it is pos-
sible to reform the CIT. This is in contrast to the legal and political
realities that hobble other (clearly superior) paths for reform. Most
obviously, states can simply broaden their sales tax bases, and yet,
though this has been the policy prescription for decades, the trend has
been the opposite. 13 It would also be better to increase local property
taxes,' 4 but many state constitutions enshrine low property taxes. It
would be better for Congress to create a national value added tax
(VAT) that states can supplement, 15 but that idea seems to be going
nowhere. Current interpretations of the Dormant Commerce Clause
12 There are important exceptions to be noted. The broad rule is that nonresident part-
ners are required to apportion their partnership shares to the source state using the same
apportionment formula, and so some noncorporate entities are, in effect, apportioning
their income. Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation 20.08[2][b][i]
(3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 25137-1 (2013). Note as well that a corpo-
ration that received income through a pass-through entity still generally needs to appor-
tion. Hellerstein & Hellerstein, supra, 9.15[6]. This is another way in which the
apportionment formula impacts noncorporate entities. Note that, as to this second cate-
gory, since such income is subject to the CIT and apportioned, it should be captured by the
data on corporate income discussed at note 41.
13 See, e.g., Mikesell, note 4, at 185.
14 See generally Darien Shanske, How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal Income
Tax to Stabilize State and Local Finance, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 413 (2012).
15 See, e.g., Stark, note 4, at 441-42.
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(and political obstacles) make it difficult for states to create VATs on
their own.
16
For a variety of reasons the state CIT is not quite so frozen-pre-
sumably partially because it is complex, and partially because it falls
(legally) on corporations and not individuals. 17 The CIT is thus
pragmatically a means of making state revenue systems better despite
its theoretical weaknesses. Given that it is one of the few avenues
available, its potential contributions should be seriously considered.
Ultimately, the argument advanced herein for why reforms to the
CIT are, and can be, positive revolves around legal absurdities of vari-
ous kinds, including that RSTs do not typically tax services, property
taxes cannot be raised, and so on. That is one reason why this is a law
article and not an economics article; for instance, economists have
known for a long time that a well-designed RST would tax services.
And so there is little economic sense to the current system or the one
that is emerging. That said, given the frailties of the current tax sys-
tem and the likelihood that no other reforms will gain traction, I think
current trends do not receive the positive attention they deserve from
commentators blinded by the superiority of regimes that, alas, cannot
be. Furthermore, any attempt to capitalize on these positive trends
must walk a legal tightrope; I propose several detailed and pragmatic
reforms consistent with current law in the concluding Part.
The structure of this Article is as follows. In Part II, I outline the
mechanics of the state CIT and detail recent reforms that have made
the CIT a better tax. In Part III, I introduce the new theory of the
CIT as complement to state RSTs. In doing so, I first explain the lim-
its of other theories of the CIT and explain what a tax complement is
exactly and why it is desirable that the CIT is a complement to the
RST. In Part IV I consider and respond to objections. Having allayed
the concerns raised by these objections, in Part V I outline ways in
which the state CIT can become a better complement to state RSTs.
Some of these proposed reforms are new as they follow from this Ar-
ticle's new approach to the CIT. Part VI concludes with the observa-
tion that, should the CIT become an effective RST complement, this
would not be the first time that the U.S. federal system has acciden-
tally backed into a serviceable fiscal arrangement.
16 See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Business Net Receipts Tax: A Dog That Will
Not Hunt, 37 Hastings Const. L.Q. 745, 764-66 (2010).
17 For a summary of current thinking about factors that may contribute to relatively low
political salience as to taxation, particularly the importance of indirectness and complexity,
see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and
Political Salience, 65 Tax L. Rev. 19, 35-41 (2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Basics of the State Corporate Income Tax
Over forty U.S. states levy a CIT, and it raises substantial revenue
(about $37 billion in 2010 or about 5.2% of state taxes).18 The CIT
has been in decline at the state and federal level for decades.19 The
reasons for the decline are many: There has been a relative decline of
corporate net income, many observers believe that there is more tax
avoidance/planning on the part of corporations, there has been an in-
crease in state expenditures through the corporate income tax aimed
(somewhat implausibly) at economic development, and there has been
an increase in new legal entities, particularly LLCs, that are attractive
alternatives to corporations. 20
State CITs, like state personal income taxes, are generally modeled
on the federal tax system. Thus a typical state CIT21 looks to see how
much income a corporation has at the federal level and then requires/
allows certain state-level adjustments. States may require that a cor-
poration report more income by denying a federal credit or deduction
and often allow corporations to report less income by making addi-
tional state-level credits available. For example, California only con-
forms to the federal income tax as it existed on January 1, 2009.22
Thus certain changes made to federal law since then are not available
to corporations paying California CIT. Sometimes states specifically
disallow federal benefits; for instance, California does not permit
firms to take so-called bonus depreciation.23 California also provides a
18 Fed'n of Tax Adm'rs, Range of State Corporate Income Tax Rates (Jan. 1, 2013) http:/
/www.taxadmin.org/Fta/rate/corp-inc.pdf (forty-six in 2013, including at least two with sig-
nificant variations on the traditional corporate income tax-Ohio's Commercial Activity
Tax and Texas' Margin Tax; Jeffrey L. Barnett & Phillip M. Vidal, U.S. Census Bureau,
State and Local Government Finances Summary: 2010, at 6 tbl.A-1; see also Phillips et al.,
note 10, at 836 (in 2010, state CIT accounted for 7.1% of total state and local business
taxes, including property taxes on commercial property).
19 Steven Maguire, Cong. Research Serv., RL 32297, State Corporate Income Taxes: A
Description and Analysis 8-9 (2006), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metacrs9311/.
20 See, e.g., Brunori, note 1, at 100-03; William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, Do Limited
Liability Companies Explain Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues?, 33 Pub. Fin. Rev.
690, 715-16 (2005); Chad H. Hill, Corporate Income Tax Reform: The View from the
States, 61 St. Tax Notes 853, 853 (Sept. 26, 2011). Note that states are making it more
difficult to escape the CIT through use of LLCs, although not uniformly. See Fox & Luna,
supra, at 715 (noting trend); see also Bruce P. Ely, Christopher R. Grissom & William T.
Thistle, State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs-2011 Update, 60 St. Tax Notes 403, 403-
14 (May 9, 2011) (current breakdown).
21 Brunori, note 1, at 105-06 (describing typical state CIT regimes).
22 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 17024.5(a)(1)(o) (West 2013).
23 Compare id. § 24349(b)(4), with IRC § 168(k).
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credit ($3000) for small firms (twenty or fewer employees) that hire a
"qualified" employee (that is, she must be full-time). 24
There are two main legal differences between the federal and state
CIT calculations.25 First, a state cannot tax just any corporation, just
like a state cannot tax just any person. The Due Process Clause and
the Dormant Commerce Clause require an appropriate level of con-
nection-nexus-between the state and corporation. 26 Second, even
if a state has nexus with a corporation, it cannot tax all of that corpo-
ration's income.27 And so, for example, California cannot tax all of
Apple's income, just the income that can be reasonably attributed (ap-
portioned) to California.
For many decades, the states have used a multifactor formula to
establish what part of a multistate corporation's business income may
be apportioned to a given state. 28 The traditional formula used three
equally-weighted factors or ratios: property, payroll, and sales.29 The
intuition behind this crude formula was that a corporation benefited
from owning property in a state, from having customers in a state, and
from having employees in a state, and so these were appropriate
factors.
30
For example, suppose California has the traditional three-factor
formula and Orange, a corporation with which California has nexus,
has $1 billion in profits. Orange owns 20% of its total property in
California, has 30% of its employees in California, and makes 10% of
its sales in California. Since each factor is weighted equally, the
blended ratio ((10% + 20% + 30%)/3) is 20%, meaning that Orange is
taxable on $200 million in profits in California. If California has a
10% CIT rate, then Orange owes $20 million.
31
For the last three decades, there has been a trend to emphasize the
sales factor (that is, to weight it doubly), or to use only the sales fac-
tor.32 I evaluate this shift in the next Part.
24 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23623 (West 2013).
25 These differences are not absolute, as, within the international system, the United
States as a single nation-state has to demonstrate an appropriate relationship to the entity
and income being taxed.
26 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
27 Id. at 313.
28 Brunori, note 1, at 102.
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., David Brunori & Joseph J. Cordes, The State Corporate Income Tax: Re-
cent Trends for a Troubled Tax 23-25 (Aug. 15, 2005), http://www.americantaxpolicyinsti
tute.org/pdf!StateCorpTax%208-15-05 %20_2_.pdf.
31 See also Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1803,
1816-20 (2012) (describing further the history and theory of apportionment).
32 See, e.g., LeAnn Luna & Matthew N. Murray, The Effects of State Tax Structure on
Business Organizational Form, 63 Nat'l Tax J. 995, 1011 (2010) (.55 average sales factor in
2008); John A. Swain, Reforming the State Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Ap-
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B. Recent Reforms: What Has Changed for the Better?33
1. Sales Factor
In 1978, in Moorman,34 the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a formula that used only the sales factor. 35 If a state uses just
the sales factor (Single Sales Factor-SSF), while other states use the
traditional three factors to apportion income, then the state with the
SSF gives an advantage to its exporters (or tries to). In-state compa-
nies that export will no longer have CIT apportioned on the basis of
in-state payroll and property, while out-of-state importers will now
have the CIT apportioned wholly on the basis of their in-state sales.
To return to the example: Since Orange only has 10% of its sales in
California, under an SSF regime California could tax $100 million of
Orange's income (as compared to $200 million under the traditional
three-factor formula). Now consider another corporation, OnlineDe-
pot. It has 5% of its employees in California, 5% of its property in
California, but 20% of its sales in California. Under the traditional
system, California could reach only 10% of OnlineDepot's income
((5% + 5% + 20%)/3), but now California could tax 20%, that is, just
its sales factor. Hence California would be shifting the weight of its
CIT to importers versus exporters-at least, that is what this shift is
supposed to do in theory and thereby, also in theory, encourage in-
state job creation.
In Moorman, the Court understood the theoretical in-state eco-
nomic advantage of using a SSF, but decided to defer to the states,
finding Iowa's SSF permissible under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.36 Why should the Court dictate that the formula that hap-
pened to be tried by most states first was the only one that was per-
mitted by the Constitution? 37
Since Moorman, and largely because of the perceived advantages of
adopting an SSF vis a vis other states, there has been a steady trend
proach to the Sourcing of Service Receipts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 285, 289-90 (2008); Federation
of Tax Administrators, State Apportionment of Corporate Income (Jan. 1, 2013), http://
www.taxadmin.org/Fta/rate/apport.pdf (forty-one states with more weight on sales in 2013,
with at least twenty-six more than double-weighting the sales factor in some cases and
sixteen only using the sales factor).
33 See generally William F. Fox, Matthew N. Murray & LeAnn Luna, How Should a
Subnational Corporate Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured?, 58 Nat'l Tax
J. 139 (2005) (similar analysis).
34 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
35 Id. at 280.
36 Id. at 273-74, 279-80.
37 See id. at 276.
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toward the adoption of the SSF.38 I largely bracket the questions
whether or not states are correct that the SSF is a spur to economic
development and, even if so, whether this is just a race to the bottom
from a national perspective. Suffice it to say I do not think there is a
persuasive economic argument favoring a shift to the SSF in the short-
or long-term. As for the short-term, it recently has been suggested
that the shift to the SSF alone increases CIT capacity.39 This argu-
ment is based on extrapolations from national data40 and yet a closer
look at one large state's experience, California's, indicates that the
shift to SSF does not by itself increase CIT capacity.
FIGURE 1
California's Experience with the Apportionment Factors
41
38 Inst. on Tax'n & Econ. Pol'y, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the "Single
Sales Factor," *2 (2012), available at http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/pbllssf.pdf.
39 Elliott Dubin, Changes in State Corporate Tax Apportionment Formulas and Tax Ba-
ses, 55 St. Tax Notes 563, 563 (Feb. 22, 2010).
40 Id. at 564.
41 Every year the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) publishes an annual report;
these reports are, to my knowledge, uniquely informative as to the CIT. At the end of
each annual report is a statistical appendix that presents the last year's apportionment
factors. See Reports, Plans, and Statistics, State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (2013), https://
www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutftb/plans-reports.shtml [hereinafter Annual Reports]. For the past
several years this data was presented in Table C-5.
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This is only one state's experience, but it strongly suggests that a
shift to SSF does not alone increase CIT capacity.42 To be sure, many
of the arguments for the SSF rely on more of a dynamic argument,
namely that over several years firms will shift more economic activity
into a state with SSF,43 and the California data presented above does
not address this argument, although I find the argument generally du-
42 Indeed, it should be noted that, as a general matter, the FTB reports the total net
income of apportioning corporations to be lower than the national data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, relied on by Dubin, note 39, at 565. So, for instance, in 2008, Dubin
attributes about $130 billion in corporate profits to California, more than 10% of the na-
tional total of about $1 trillion. Id. at 567. Yet California reported the total net'income of
corporations to be approximately $600 billion, with about $68 billon in income apportioned
to California. Table C-2, Corporation Tax, Synopsis of Tax Liability Calculations, All Cor-
porations, State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (2010), available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/
aboutFTB/raxStatistics[Reports/BusinessEntities/2009_C-2.pdf. Note as well that the
sales factor that FTB reported for 2008 was only 5.4%, or less than half the number Dubin
reasonably arrived at using California's share of national GDP. Table C-5, Apportionment
Formula Results, Tax Years 2008-2009, All Corporations, State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd.
(2010), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/TaxStatistics/Reports/2010 C-5.pdf
[hereinafter Table C-5]; Dubin, note 39, at 565. And so the real question is why the re-
ported sales factor is consistently so low in California. This is a question I will return to in
later research; at least prima facie it suggests structural problems with the sales factor and/
or tax planning. One way, going forward, to try to grapple with this question is to consider
what, if anything, changes in light of California's new rules governing the sales factor. Spe-
cifically, starting in 2011, California corporations that opt to use SSF were also required to
calculate their complete sales factor on a destination basis (that is, including the sales of
intangibles and services). Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 25128.5, 25136 (West 2011). This
could result in fewer planning opportunities and a California sales factor that more closely
reflects California's share of the national market. The regulations California has promul-
gated in connection with sourcing are particularly comprehensive, making it perhaps more
likely that they will be effective. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 25136-2 (2011); see Waltreese
Carroll, California FTB Official Explains Sourcing Regulations, 63 St. Tax Notes 10 (Apr.
2, 2012).
43 See Austan Goolsbee & Edward L. Maydew, Coveting Thy Neighbor's Manufactur-
ing: The Dilemma of State Income Apportionment, 75 J. Pub. Econ. 125, 142 (2000) (lead-
ing study finding positive impact of emphasizing the sales factor on employment within an
individual state but noting that this is not a positive development nationally because each
state is gaining jobs at the expense of others); Sanjay Gupta & Mary Ann Hofmann, The
Effect of State Income Tax Apportionment and Tax Incentives on New Capital Expendi-
tures, 25 J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n (Supp.) 1, 22 (2003) (finding "the state corporate income tax
burden on property has a statistically significant negative effect on new capital expendi-
tures by corporations in the manufacturing sector").
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bious44 if for no other reason than when one state adopts SSF, then
neighboring states tend to follow suit.
45
If the shift to the SSF is not positive in terms of economic develop-
ment, then why am I labeling it a positive change? The first reason is
that should every state have a CIT that is apportioned using an SSF,
then all states would be taxing every multistate corporation using the
same base. And most states, following the Uniform Division of In-
come for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), are working from the same
interpretation of the sales factor.46 That uniformity is inherently de-
sirable and should be encouraged.
47
Yet the key reason for supporting a national shift by states to the
SSF is not based on uniformity, but on the efficiency of the CIT com-
plementing the RST. This reasoning starts from the seminal argument
by Charles McLure in which he argues that a tax apportioned based
on factors (like the CIT) is actually (in some situations) just a tax on
those factors.48 In the traditional case therefore, the state CIT decom-
poses into a tax on corporate property, employment, and sales. By
shifting to the SSF, the states are moving only to tax the income
earned from corporate sales, which makes the CIT a kind of sales
(that is, consumption) tax, albeit one placed (at least in the first in-
stance) on the seller rather than on the consumer. 49 The more a cor-
44 See Michael Mazerov & Robert Tannenwald, Ctr. on Budget and Pol'y Priorities,
Flawed Study Should Be Given No Credence in Evaluating Jobs and Revenue Impact of
California Corporate Tax Break (2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-29-10sfp.
pdf (referring to Charles W. Swenson, On the Impact of a Single Sales Factor on California
Jobs and Economic Growth (June 2010), available at http://www.btrc.maryland.gov/arti
cles/documents/swenson-ca-ssf.pdf. The most recent version of the technical paper associ-
ated with this study is Charles Swenson, On the Effectiveness of Single Sales Factors for
State Taxation (June 2011), available at https://msbfile03.usc.edu/digitalmeasures/cswens
on/intellcont/SSF%20JATA%20submission %2OJune%202011-1.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Kelly D. Edmiston, Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income
Tax: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, 55 Nat'l Tax J. 239, 250-51 (2002);
Thomas C. Omer & Marjorie K. Shelley, Competitive, Political, and Economic Factors
Influencing State Tax Policy Changes, 26 J. Am. Tax'n Ass'n (Supp.) 103, 104-05 (2004).
The biggest holdouts as to the traditional system are states that have large natural re-
source-based industries, which stand to gain more income to apportion by continuing to
rely on property and payroll. Bharat N. Anand & Richard Sansing, The Weighting Game:
Formula Apportionment as an Instrument of Public Policy, 53 Nat'l Tax J. 183, 193 (2000).
46 See Unif. Div. of Income for Tax Purposes Act §§ 15-17 (1957); e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax
Code §§ 25134-25136 (West 2010). This uniformity should not be exaggerated. For exam-
ple, California has a new market-based interpretation of the sales factor as to sales other
than intangibles. See note 42.
47 See, e.g., Brunori, note 1, at 110; Shaviro, note 2, at 975, 979-85.
48 Charles E. McLure Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves' Clothing,
in The Economics of Taxation 327, 341-42 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds.,
1980).
49 Cf. Michael J. McIntyre & Richard D. Pomp, A Policy Analysis of Michigan's Misla-
beled Gross Receipts Tax, 53 Wayne L. Rev. 1283, 1287 n.28 (2007) (not finding the argu-
ment for economic development a compelling justification for SSF, but noting that taxing
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poration, say Amazon, sells in a given state, the more of its income
will be taxable in that state. Say the state is California and the CIT
rate is 10%, then Amazon is paying a 10% tax on the net income from
its sales into California 50 and, to the extent possible, Amazon will
push these taxes onto the consumer. This looks like part of a national
consumption tax if Amazon pays CIT on its sales wherever it sells.51
And CIT rates, though not uniform, are within a relatively narrow
(low) band.
5 2
This new aspect of the CIT is at the heart of my argument, and I
should not proceed before noting a bit more deeply the important
qualifications to interpreting the CIT as a kind of consumption tax.53
First, the argument applies only to corporations (and perhaps LLCs).
Second, it applies only to corporations that do business in multiple
states. Third, this is an income tax, and so a corporation that does not
have net income for any reason will not be pushing any tax anywhere.
Fourth, the apportionment formula is not the same as taxing the trans-
action itself-there are an enormous number of possible outcomes as
to the final tax burden depending on, for example, the location of a
corporation's profits and sales.5 4 Finally, even if a CIT with SSF does
approximate a sales tax, it does so with the problem of pyramiding55
and indeed may make the problem worse by taxing services that are to
be used by other businesses.
Nevertheless, I argue that the state CIT is becoming a useful com-
plement to state RSTs.5 6 Before making this argument in detail, I out-
imports and not exports is more compelling (a result of SSF) if the goal is to tax consump-
tion properly).
50 This simple intuition will be increasingly complicated, particularly in Section IV.C.
51 In this way, the U.S. states are where international proponents of global formulary
apportionment hope the world ends up, following the U.S. lead. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax
Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497, 522 (2009);
Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 Va. Tax Rev. 593, 606-07
(2010).
52 See, e.g., Luna & Murray, note 32, at 1011 (average 6.7% in 2008); Range of State
Corporate Income Tax Rates, Fed'n of Tax Adm'rs, available at http://www.taxadmin.org/
Fta/rate/corp-inc.pdf (most rates between 5% and 9%); see also Jack Mintz & Joann M.
Weiner, Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base in the European Union, 62 Tax L. Rev. 81, 97 (2008) (relatively low U.S. rates in
contrast to EU rates).
53 The shift to SSF does not make the CIT a better measure of corporate income. See,
e.g., Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 Tax L. Rev. 169, 219 n.185 (2007) (noting issue).
54 This was noted by McLure from the start. See McLure, note 48, at 333-34; see also
Morse, note 51, at 609-13 (elaborating on the different scenarios). I explore McLure and
Morse's observations in detail in Section IV.C.
55 See discussion in Section IV.B.
56 This idea that somehow the CIT is justified because of its relationship with other
superior taxes is not novel. See Part III; see also Daniel Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Cor-
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line some of the other positive developments that characterize the
new state CIT.
2. Services and Intangibles
In general, the emerging "uniform national sales factor" (based on
UDITPA 57) includes sales from services and other intangibles. This is
crucial because the standard RST does not include most services or
intangibles. The sales factor thus captures a broader swath of con-
sumption activity than an RST, a particularly important point given
that the economy has shifted from sale of tangible goods (think com-
pact discs) to services and intangibles (think iTunes). RSTs are com-
monly argued to reach only one-third of transactions.58 This shift
seems only likely to accelerate.
Looking more closely at CIT data reveals the import of the broader
sales factor. For example, in 2008, apportioning corporations in Cali-
fornia claimed they made over $1.7 trillion in sales into California.59
Meanwhile, in 2008-2009, California collected sales and use tax based
on transactions worth a little less than $500 billion,60 a difference of a
factor of three and so here too an indication that the sales factor is
capturing many times as many sales as the RST.
61
One can go further. In recent years, retail corporations represented
around 10% of CIT liability, both in California and nationally. 62 And
thus, for instance, the national breakdown in 2008 looked like this:
porate Tax 15 (2009) (entertaining the idea that the individual income tax on dividends is a
"fallback" given the flaws in the corporate income tax); Louis Kaplow, The Theory of
Taxation and Public Economics 237-38 (2008) (rejecting traditional justifications for the
CIT and observing that a successful justification would involve remedying "some external-
ity" or "some deficiency introduced by income taxation.").
57 UDITPA §§ 15, 17. Note that there is diversity in state sales factors, even increasing
diversity as states shift to destination-based factors, but for this purpose there is still
(rough) uniformity in the inclusion of services and intangibles.
58 See, e.g., Cal. Comm'n on the 21st Century Economy, Final Report 19-20 (2009),
available at http://www.cotce.ca.gov/documents/reports/documents/Commission on the_
21st_- CenturyEconomy-FinalReport.pdf; Brunori, note 1, at 67; Iris Lav, Elizabeth C.
McNichol & Robert Zahradnik, Faulty Foundations: State Structural Budget Problems
and How to Fix Them, 37 St. Tax Notes 43, 47 (July 4, 2005).
59 State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., note 42, tbl.C-5.
60 Cal. Bd. of Equal., 2008-2009 Annual Report A-28 tbl.19 (State Sales and Use Tax
Statistics, by Type of Business), available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/annual/pdf/2009/2008-
09_statisticalappendix.pdf.
61 Although the comparison is far from perfect, as many sales for RST purposes are
conducted by nonapportioning business entities. Furthermore, to the extent that the RST
is not supposed to tax business inputs, all sales captured by the sales factor ought not to be
subject to a perfect RST. Despite these qualifications, I find these figures suggestive.
62 For national averages, based on Bureau of Economic Analysis statistics of corporate
profitability, see Dubin, note 39, at 566. The California average is based on State of Cal.
Franchise Tax Bd. Table C-10A, C Corporations: Tax Liability by Industry, (2010), availa-
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FIGURE 2





For California, the breakdown in 2008 was similar:
FIGURE 3




ble at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/Tax-Statistics/Reports/2010C-1OA-B.pdf [herein-
after Table C-10A].
63 See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Table 6.18D, Taxes on Corporate Income by Industry,
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index.cfm (follow "GDP & Personal Income"
hyperlink; then click on "Begin using the data..." button; then click on "Section 6 -
Income and Employment by Industry" to expand; then follow "Table 6.18D. Taxes on
Corporate Income by Industry (A)" hyperlink).
64 State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., Table C-10A, note 62. As the national data indicates,
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Thus, both nationally and in California, service-type corporations
that do not remit the RST had at least three times the CIT liability as
retailers, which (presumably) do remit the RST. To be sure, other
corporations, such as wholesalers and manufacturers, also remit a
large amount of the RST, as business-to-business transactions are esti-
mated to constitute about 40% of total RST collections nationally,
65
which amounted to $127.7 billion in 2009.66 And, to the extent service
providers sell services to other businesses, these service providers ide-
ally should not charge sales tax and so the current situation is appro-
priate. Nevertheless, these charts still indicate that corporate retailers
are a small part of the CIT base relative to other parts of the base that
almost certainly do not remit any RST but, ideally, ought to at least
for some transactions.
Perhaps it could be objected that apportioning corporations,
whatever the industry, do not represent a sizable portion of the CIT
base. Put another way, only multi-state corporations apportion and
so, even if the sales factor captures more sales, this would not help
much in complementing the RST if the CIT was mostly paid by
nonapportioning, that is, entirely in-state, corporations. This does not
appear to be so. In California, between 1999 and 2009, the total state
net income of apportioning corporations has represented over 90% of
total state net income from corporations; this was as true for 2006
(when CIT collections were over $9 billion) as it was for 2009 (when
CIT collections were just over $7 billion). 67
California's percentages are not anomalous. Data for other states is similar. For example,
in Oregon, the retail sector was responsible for 12% of CIT receipts in 2011. Or. Dep't of
Rev., Oregon Corporate Excise and Income Tax Characteristics of Corporate Taxpayers 2-
4 exh.2.5 (2011), available at http://www.oregon.gov/dor/forms/business/corporate-excise-
income_102-405_2011.pdf. In Minnesota in 2005, retail accounted for 16.7%. Minn. Dep't
of Rev., 2005 Minnesota Corporate Income Tax Bull. 9 tbl.G (2009), available at http://
www.revenue.state.mn.us/research-stats/research-reports/2005/research-corp-bul-05-
links.pdf.
65 Raymond J. Ring, Jr., Consumers' Share and Producers' Share of the General Sales
Tax, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 79, 81-92 (1999).
66 Phillips et al., note 10, at 837.
67 See State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., Annual Reports, note 41 (data based on Table C-
2A). This is true for other states as well. For instance, in Oregon, this percentage was
89.4%. See Or. Dep't of Revenue, note 64, at 3-9 exh.3.8. It was over 90% in Minnesota in
2005 (counting "unitary" and "multistate" taxpayers). See Minn. Dep't of Rev., note 64, at
6 tbl.D. The intuitive finding that larger corporations pay the vast majority of the CIT is
replicated at the federal level as well. See, e.g., Caitlin Bokulic, Erin Henry & George
Plesko, The Distribution of Corporate Income: Tabulations from the Schedule M-3, 2004-
2008, Stat. of Income Bull., Spring 2012, at 128, 134.
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a. A Note on Destination Basis
The sales factor is hardly self-interpreting, even as to tangible prop-
erty,68 but it is particularly befuddling as to intangible property and
services, which are the particular kinds of sales I argue the sales factor
should include. Some of the complexity here is just inherent to these
kinds of transactions-where is the "sale" when a cloud computing
firm sells its services to a multistate corporation when that corpora-
tion's employees will use that service in many states? This is a prob-
lem that bedevils even VATs.
69
Nevertheless, a fair amount of the complexity and incoherence
plaguing the sales factor was a self-inflicted wound that states are now
moving to correct. Most notably, the original sales factor rule man-
dated that sales of tangible property be sourced to the destination of
the sale, whereas services and intangibles would be sourced (as a gen-
eral matter) to the state where the services or intangible were
produced.7
0
Following Swain, I note as to this distinction that it "simply was not
that well thought out," 7 and as such, I say little about it except to
urge its disappearance. After all, if the sales factor is meant to capture
the contribution of the market state to the economic activity that the
corporation profits from, then why the rule should ever not be based
on the destination principle is unclear. Indeed, destination basis is
probably more administrable because it is (generally) easier to deter-
mine where a service is consumed than produced (again consider a
complicated piece of software in the cloud), 72 and so there is no logis-
tical reason to have such a theoretically weak rule.
68 For instance, what if an out-of-state purchaser comes in state to pick up a good?
Where did the sale occur? See, e.g., Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, Kirk J.
Stark, John A. Swain & Joan M. Youngman, State and Local Taxation: Cases and Materi-
als 586 (9th ed. 2009) (dispute on location of "dock sales").
69 Swain, note 32, at 342-44.
70 Compare UDIPTA § 16, with UDITPA § 17.
7' Swain, note 32, at 300.
72 Id. at 312-13. For the argument in the international context, see Avi-Yonah et al.,
note 51, at 509-10. The cloud computing example is also an example of the challenge in
sourcing intangibles on a destination basis (for example, what if we are discussing a
database that is being used in multiple states?). The new and comprehensive California
sourcing regulations might turn out to be a big step in improving matters through their
(relatively) comprehensive set of presumptions and cascades. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18,
§ 25136-2 (2012); Waltreese Carroll, California FTB Official Explains Sourcing Regula-
tions, 64 St. Tax Notes 10 (Apr. 2, 2012). It might be objected that, even if so, perhaps a
similar intellectual exertion could have aided the traditional source approach. Yet, as ar-
gued above, this great effort is far more theoretically justified in the case of destination
basis. And I should add that this observer naively clings to the belief that the greater
intellectual coherence of destination-based analysis must ultimately improve its adminis-
trability as well.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 66:320 TAX LAW REVIEW
2013] A NEW THEORY OF THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 321
As it turns out, there is a trend among the states to move to a desti-
nation interpretation of the sales factor.73 Appropriately, for the past
few years there has been a project at the Multistate Tax Commission
to prepare a model statute for the states to emulate, and the project
has resulted in what appears to be a reasonable model statute.74 The
Commission has not yet voted on the proposal, however. 75 Individual
states do not need to wait for the MTC-they can still use the draft
statute and the statutes of other states as models.
3. Nexus
The federal Constitution requires that states have a nexus with the
corporations they are seeking to tax. This nexus requirement has two
components. The first component, deriving from the Due Process
Clause, is easily met in most circumstances, as it requires "pur-
poseful[ ] avail[ment] ... of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State," and does not require physical presence.76  Sending
goods or services into a state should usually suffice for this kind of
nexus so long as they are not minimal.
77
The second and more challenging nexus test is required under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, although just what this test requires is
vague-"substantial nexus" are the magic words for when a state may
tax an entity (or individual) or compel an entity or individual to col-
lect the use tax.78 We know that substantial nexus requires "physical
presence '79 when the question is collection of the use tax (the sales
73 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25136(b) (West 2012); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/
304(a)(3)(c5)(iv) (West 2012); see Hellerstein et al., note 68, at 594; Memorandum from
Shirley Sicilian, Gen. Counsel, Multistate Tax Comm'n, to Wood Miller and Members of
MTC Income & Franchise Tax Uniformity Subcommittee 3 (Jan. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate-Tax-Commission/Uniformity/Minutes/Com
pact%20Revisions%20-%2OUniformity%20memo%201-12-09.pdf (noting that at least five
Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) Compact member states, fourteen overall, have moved
towards the destination principle).
74 See Multistate Tax Comm'n, MTC Draft Sec. 17(a)(4) and (5) Amendments (Apr. 10,
2012), available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate-Tax-Commission/Uni
formity[Minutes/Draft %20sec%2017.a(4)%20and %20(5) %20amendments.pdf.
75 Amy Hamilton, MTC Panel Works on UDITPA, Discusses NCSL Objections, 62 St.
Tax Notes 647 (Dec. 5, 2011). In 2008, when John Swain wrote his important piece on
adopting a destination rule, he had assumed that the Uniform Law Commission would
address the issue, Swain, note 32, at 287, but the project was apparently derailed by the
same parties that have now delayed the MTC effort. See Hamilton, supra.
76 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992).
77 See id. at 328.
78 Id. at 313. Among the many infirmities of the Quill decision, it did not consider that
the obligation in Quill was the obligation to collect the use tax and not to pay it.
79 Id. at 314-16. But "how much physical presence" is a much-debated question even as
to the obligation to collect the use tax. Compare Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 654
N.E.2d. 954, 960-61 (N.Y. 1995) (not requiring that the physical presence itself be substan-
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
322 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:
tax paid on out-of-state purchases), but the Court left it ambiguous
whether physical presence is the test for nexus for other kinds of
taxes. Accordingly, lower courts,80 legislatures, 81 and commentators
82
have argued that the bright-line physical presence test does not apply
to income taxes-instead what is required is "significant economic
presence." As to a major corporation like Amazon or the apportion-
ing service corporations discussed above, this level of connection is
(arguably) relatively easy to find.83 This means that, at least as to
nexus, a state like California can require Amazon to pay its own cor-
porate income tax, but cannot require Amazon to collect the use tax
already owed by California consumers.
It is a legal anomaly, of course, that state corporate income tax pay-
ment obligations have a broader reach than the obligation to collect
the use tax,84 but this is the situation, and states should design their
tax systems accordingly.
tial), with In re Appeal of Intercard, Inc., 14 P.3d 1111, 1119 (Kan. 2000) (explicitly re-
jecting the analysis of Orvis because physical presence needs to be more substantial).
80 See, e.g., Tax Commissioner v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 232 (W.Va.
2006).
81 See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23101(b) (West 2012).
82 See, e.g., John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy
Perspective, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 319, 371-72 (2003).
83 See, e.g., MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 235-36 ("The record shows that MBNA[, the tax-
payer,] continuously and systematically engaged in direct mail and telephone solicitation
and promotion in West Virginia .... MBNA had significant gross receipts attributable to
West Virginia customers in the amount of $8,419,431.00 .... In light of these facts, this
Court has no trouble concluding that MBNA's systematic and continuous business activity
in this State produced significant gross receipts attributable to its West Virginia customers
which indicate a significant economic presence sufficient to meet the substantial nexus
prong of Complete Auto."); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23101(b)(2) (West 2012) ("[A] tax-
payer is doing business in this state for a taxable year if... [s]ales ... of the taxpayer in this
state exceed the lesser of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or 25 percent of the
taxpayer's total sales.").
84 One might contend that this is not so, that differences in the nature of these taxes
explain the difference in legal treatment. Certainly, the MNBA court argued this was the
case, observing that the CIT is collected much less frequently by many fewer entities and
this justified a broader jurisdictional rule. MBNA, 640 S.E.2d at 233-34. A vigorous dis-
sent responded by noting that the CIT is much more complicated than the RST, and in any
event neither the Court nor Congress have blessed such a distinction. Id. at 239 (Benja-
min, J., dissenting). On balance, I see no good reason for the difference in rules as a
matter of federal constitutional law, especially since, as argued here, the two taxes can
serve as complements to a significant degree. For more on this issue, see Andrew J. Haile,
Sales Tax Exceptionalism, 4 Colum. J. Tax L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 49-50),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2153180.
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a. A Note on Public Law 86-27285
In 1959, Congress placed a statutory constraint on states in connec-
tion with "net income tax[es]," and only taxes measured by net in-
come.8 6 Thus if states can dodge the Scylla of Quill through the
income tax, they must still cope with the Charybdis of Public Law 86-
272. Public Law 86-272, roughly, forbids states collecting a "net in-
come tax" if "the only business [of the taxpayer] within [the state is]
... solicitation of orders. 87 Return to the example of Amazon from
above. Since its only activities in most states are, by design, merely
solicitation, then Public Law 86-272 protects it from an obligation to
pay the CIT, and thus the CIT cannot serve as a fallback to the RST.
Yet Public Law 86-272 ought not to be interpreted as such a signifi-
cant hurdle. First, its protection applies to firms that "only" engage in
solicitation of orders of "tangible personal property. 88 Thus a firm
like Amazon-or any other seller of intangibles-would seem to be
out of luck to the extent that it is also selling cloud computing ser-
vices 89 or even (arguably) e-books. Public Law 86-272 also does not
protect corporations that sell services.
Second, states tend to interpret "solicitation" narrowly, meaning
that an out-of-state corporation has to engage in relatively little in-
state activity to lose the protection of Public Law 86-272.9 Thus, ac-
cording to the MTC, the following in-state activities result in loss of
protection (if more than de minimis):
1. Making repairs or providing maintenance or service to
the property sold or to be sold.
2. Collecting current or delinquent accounts, whether di-
rectly or by third parties, through assignment or
otherwise.
3. Investigating credit worthiness.
4. Installation or supervision of installation at or after ship-
ment or delivery. 91
85 Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 78 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 381-384 (2012)).
86 15 U.S.C. § 381.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), Amazon, http://aws.amazon.
com/ec2/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
90 See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 726 N.E.2d 12, 18-19 (I11. App. Ct.
2000) (holding that limited in-state activities amounted to more than mere solicitation);
Peterson v. State Tax Assessor, 724 A.2d 610, 613 (Me. 1999)(same); see also Hellerstein &
Hellerstein, note 12, 6.18[1][d].
91 Multistate Tax Comm'n, Statement of Information Concerning Practices of Multistate
Tax Commission and Signatory States Under Public Law 86-272, at 3 (July 27, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedfiles/multistate tax-commission/uniformity/uniformit
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And this is not just a matter of states embracing a narrow interpre-
tation on their own, as the MTC guidelines explicitly follow the lead
Supreme Court precedent, Wrigley,92 in interpreting Public Law 86-
272. In Wrigley, the Court held that the only in-state activities pro-
tected by Public Law 86-272 are those "entirely ancillary to requests
for purchases-those that serve no independent business function
apart from their connection to the solicitation of orders. ' 93 Hence the
MTC's (reasonable) conclusion that making in-state repairs or super-
vising installation undoes the Public Law 86-272 protection because a
firm has an independent business reason to engage in such activities
beyond solicitation.
Public Law 86-272 was meant to be temporary; it was not carefully
drafted at the time and, in any event, like the sales factor under the
original UDITPA or the Quill physical presence rule, it is anachronis-
tic. Fortunately, because of its weak drafting and subsequent judicial
narrowing, the import of Public Law 86-272 is waning.94
4. Combined Reporting
Of course, Public Law 86-272 does protect some taxpayers-espe-
cially if they plan their operations carefully so as to stay within its
protection. It is not clear that such planning activity should be viewed
as abusive tax sheltering, as Congress explicitly provided this exemp-
tion, and so it seems more a matter of bad tax policy at the federal
level. Nevertheless, if used aggressively enough, this effect of a poor
federal law could undermine the state CIT, making the proposals of
this Article irrelevant. I have already discussed why the current inter-
pretation of Public Law 86-272 makes it difficult for many corpora-
tions to insulate themselves from the CIT. Thus, for example, it is in
the business interest of many corporations to sell services and in-
tangibles in-state, and thus they will lose the protection of Public Law
86-272.
But what if a corporation could continue all its profitable in-state
activities and still retain significant protections under Public Law 86-
272? For instance, suppose a seller of tangible personal property,
computer manufacturer X Co., also wants to offer service contracts in
connection with those products. Ordinarily, if the same corporation
y-projects/a_ -z/statementofinfopubliclaw86-272.pdf; see also State of Cal. Franchise Tax
Bd., Application and Interpretation of Public Law 86-272, FTB 1050 (REV 06-2011), avail-
able at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/misc/1050.pdf (California employs the MTC
guidelines).
92 Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214 (1992).
93 Id. at 228-29.
94 And hopefully will continue to wane. See notes 164-65 (and accompanying text dis-
cussing the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act).
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
[Vol. 66:
2013] A NEW THEORY OF THE STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 325
provides both goods and in-state service, there would be no Public
Law 86-272 exemption. Perhaps the seller of tangible personal prop-
erty, however, could create an in-state subsidiary, Y, to service the
contracts-thereby shielding the sales of tangible personal property
from the CIT. The argument would be that this subsidiary is an inde-
pendent contractor and should not trigger income tax liability for X
Co. Surely if X Co. just sold its computers to an in-state wholesaler it
would not lose Public Law 86-272 protection. This is probably so,
95
but the definition of "independent contractor" under Public Law 86-
272 is narrow.96 Thus an independent contractor must be "engaged in
selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangible personal property
for more than one principal and. . . hold[ ] himself out as such in the
regular course of his business activities."'97 In other words, this partic-
ular tax planning technique only works if manufacturer X Co. is will-
ing to share its servicing profits (and perhaps reputation) with an in-
state firm that services the equipment of other firms.98
Now consider a related planning gambit, one that more clearly (to
this observer) veers into the abusive. Now out-of-state X Co. does not
try to protect its income by means of Public Law 86-272, but instead
by stripping all of its profits out of a state. Here is how it might work.
Suppose there is a state with a high CIT; call it California. Next door
is a state without a CIT; call it Nevada. Now X Co. actually makes all
its sales in California and should pay tax on its net income there. But
instead X creates a new Y Co. in Nevada and places in that firm all of
its intellectual property. Y Co. then charges X Co. a high price to
license its (Y's) intellectual property, thereby reducing (or eliminat-
ing) X Co.'s profits in California and hence its CIT liability.
Again, even if one did not find such shifting of income abusive, it is
obvious that such maneuvers vitiate the CIT. The way to prevent this
whittling down of the CIT base is to impose combined reporting re-
quirements on corporations. In the above example, a state with a
combined reporting requirement, like California, would be able to
force the combined reporting group that includes X Co. and Y Co. to
pay CIT to California on the basis of Y's (intercompany) profits.99
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (2012).
96 Id. § 381(d)(1).
97 Id.
98 For an example of the failure of this planning technique, see Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Reader's
Digest lost the protection of Public Law 86-272 when it conducted all of its marketing in
California through a wholly-owned subsidiary).
99 See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, § 25106.5-1(a)(6) (2012) ("Seller ([Y Co.]) and
Buyer ([X Co.]) are generally treated as divisions of a single corporation for purposes of
taking into account their items from intercompany transactions."); see also Haile, note 31,
at 1819-21.
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Following an MTC recommendation, a majority of states with a CIT
have now adopted combined reporting, 100 which means that the CIT
base is being increasingly protected from this particular form of tax
planning. a01 The legal status of combined reporting requirements ap-
pears fairly sound.102
This is not to say that there are not other significant planning op-
portunities at the state CIT level, 10 3 though one may wonder how seri-
ous a problem this is. Certainly, attempts to estimate the impact of
tax planning have been fraught with difficulties. °4 Weighing against
rampant planning is that most states in the United States have CITs,
and the range of their rates is pretty narrow. 0 5 This is, for instance, a
significant improvement over CIT rates at the international level. Of
course, some of these techniques, if successful, reduce the CIT burden
generally to zero (say, by shifting all income to a state without a CIT),
and this does seem to be a significant incentive.
The conclusion here, as in all the other Sections, is that state CITs,
often for no particularly good reason (for example, moving to SSF to
spur economic development), have generally evolved in a positive di-
rection. The CIT base has grown more uniform (for example, through
the shift to SSF), more theoretically sound (for example, through the
adoption of the destination principle), broader (for example, through
the interpretation of nexus), and more stable (for example, through
the shift to combined reporting). As already noted, in its increasing
100 Michael Mazerov, A Majority of States Have Now Adopted a Key Corporate Tax
Reform-"Combined Reporting," Ctr. on Budget & Pol'y Priorities 1 (Apr. 3, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.cbpp.org/4-5-07sfp.pdf; Multistate Tax Comm'n, Proposed Model Stat-
ute for Combined Reporting (July 29, 2011), available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploaded
Files/MultistateTaxCommission/UniformityUniformityProjects/A_-_Z/Combined%20
Reporting%20-%20FINAL%20version.pdf. Presumably this success of an MTC recom-
mendation is one reason why opponents of a destination-based interpretation of the sales
factor have so far stalled similar action at the MTC on the sales factor.
101 Note that combined reporting is not the only way states have countered such profit-
stripping gambits. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993)
(establishing nexus between physical stores and an intangible holding company).
102 See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 785-88 (1992)
(reaffirming the unitary business principle); see also Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51 (1987) (holding that nexus can be established via inde-
pendent contractors).
103 See Donald Bruce, John Deskins & William F. Fox, On the Extent, Growth, and
Efficiency Consequences of State Business Tax Planning, in Taxing Corporate Income in
the 21st Century 226, 232-34 (Alan J. Auerbach, James R. Hines, Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Taxing Corporate Income].
104 See, e.g., William M. Gentry, Comments, in Taxing Corporate Income, note 103, at
257 (responding to Bruce et al., note 103); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Comments, in Taxing
Corporate Income, note 103, at 262 (same); see also Amy Hamilton, COST Rebuts Corpo-
rate Tax Dodging Report, 62 St. Tax Notes 781, 781-82 (Dec. 19, 2011) (describing the
recent dispute between different policy analysts/advocacy groups).
105 Luna & Murray, note 32, at 1014; Roin, note 53, at 234.
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breadth, the CIT includes sales of goods and services not taxed under
state RSTs. It is this aspect of the new, better CIT that I theorize in
the next Part.
III. A NEW THEORY OF THE NEW STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAx
A ferocious debate rages about the ideal tax base: consumption or
income.10 6 Fortunately, we do not need to wade into it. One reason is
that when talking about state taxes we are so far from the ideal that
these theoretical debates gain little traction. But the deeper reason is
that there is actually little theoretical debate on the key issue. It is not
particularly controversial to argue that the states should tax consump-
tion, and it is even less controversial to argue that, should they tax
consumption, then they should do so on as broad a base as possible.
1 7
It is this final uncontroversial goal-taxing as broad a consumption
base as possible-that I believe that the new CIT is (clumsily)
advancing.
A. Tax Assignment
The first step towards articulating the implicit new theory of the
CIT is through the literature on tax assignment in a federal system.
We need this background to ascertain whether or not a CIT should be
levied at the state level. If the current case for the CIT itself is not
strong, as I argue that it is not, then that opens up the possibility of a
better justification, which is what I offer. I note at the outset that I am
not at all certain that this new justification, even added to the old jus-
tifications, makes even a moderately compelling case for states retain-
ing their CITs. Nevertheless, this Article is an exercise in the possible
and, since state CITs are not going anywhere, this new, better justifi-
cation can serve as a guide to more efficacious reforms.
The theory of tax assignment has a few canonical propositions. The
first proposition is that to the extent possible, tax bases should be as-
signed according to the benefit principle. The benefit principle states:
106 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 4, at 1414; see also William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1122-23
(1974) (establishing the classic arguments for consumption taxes); Chris William Sanchir-
ico, Tax Eclecticism, 64 Tax L. Rev. 149, 149-50 (2011) (responding to Bankman and Weis-
bach, and others); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income
Tax?, 89 Yale L.J. 1081, 1081-83 (1980) (providing the classic response to arguments for
consumption taxes).
107 See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, note 4, at 1418.
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A government should levy taxes on citizens in proportion to the bene-
fits that citizens demand from that level of government.108
The literature identifies several efficiency-related benefits to taxing
according to the benefit principle above and beyond any philosophical
preference for matching up the benefits and burdens of government
services as closely as possible. First, it is reasonably argued' 09-and
empirically somewhat robustly supported' 10-that maintaining a rela-
tionship between benefit and burden helps taxpayers monitor govern-
ment services. This "monitoring" goes beyond observing that money
is well spent, but whether it should be spent on a certain project at all.
Local people know if the local school needs to be replaced better than
a distant central bureaucrat. And, to the extent there is more mobility
at the local level, local voters are able to express their preferences by
voting with their feet, the heart of the Tiebout model.
Furthermore, taxes applied according to the benefit principle en-
hance the locational neutrality of business decisions. Suppose X Co. is
trying to decide to locate in California or Nevada and suppose that
California and Nevada have different tax rates because of different
redistributive spending programs. X Co. may choose the lower tax
state if the rates are different enough (and it does not value the redis-
tribution) even if it makes more sense to choose otherwise for busi-
ness reasons. Yet if the difference in taxes is wholly attributable to
services that X Co. values, say police protection, then it will make its
decision solely on the grounds of which location makes the most busi-
ness sense. 1' This is the achievement of domestic "capital ownership
108 Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 231 (3d ed. 2010); Richard A.
Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice 212 (2d ed. 1976).
109 See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ.
416 (1956) (providing the classic argument); Gruber, note 108, at 267-75 (summarizing sub-
sequent analyses); William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis (2001) (serving as a
modern classic).
110 See, e.g., Gruber, note 108, at 271-72 (summarizing studies); Robert Inman, Com-
mentary, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty 46, 46-53 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) (same);
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
346, 405-06, 416-17 (1990) (same). Just because one acknowledges that the Tiebout model
has some explanatory power does not mean that one needs to grant that it is normatively
desirable (at least on its own). See Briffault, supra, at 404-05; see also Darien Shanske,
Above All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solu-
tion to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 663, 672-74 (2010).
111 William H. Oakland & William A Testa, State-Local Business Taxation and the Ben-
efits Principle, 20 Economic Perspectives-Fed. Res. Bank of Chi. 1, 5 (1996) ("[B]usiness
taxes which conform to the benefits principle will be neutral with respect to economic
development. They place the jurisdiction at neither a competitive advantage nor disadvan-
tage per se.").
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neutrality, ' 112 an important term in international taxation-whichever
firm owns a local asset will pay the same benefit taxes (say property
taxes) and so whichever firm that can make best use of an asset will
own it-enhancing national efficiency.
Applied to the theory of tax assignment in a federal system, the
benefit principle indicates that taxes should be assigned to the lowest
level of government consistent with the provision of the goods or ser-
vices that the taxes are to be spent on.'1 3 Thus, taxes to support
schools generally are assigned to the local level so that taxpayers can
observe the connection between their taxes and their schools and can
then vote for the level of provision that they want." 4 For certain pub-
lic goods, like national defense, such assignment is not possible, and it
is properly the role of the central government paid for by means of
nationwide income taxes.
The second proposition, also a direct application of the benefit prin-
ciple, is that the property tax should be assigned to local governments
because local governments are charged with providing many of the
services that benefit (real) property, particularly education, but also
police and fire protection and other amenities (such as parks).115
Property taxes are also assigned to local governments because of ease
of administration--real property is hard to hide and impossible to
move.116 I observe that, despite the arguments in favor of the prop-
erty tax, the use of the local property tax has been in decline for
decades.
The third proposition is that the benefit principle indicates a role for
the sales tax at the state and local level. This is because both levels of
government provide consumers with the benefit of a market. Further-
more, although the economic incidence of these taxes should fall on
consumers (that is, they are the ones who get the market), the legal
incidence falls on merchants, making such taxes relatively easy to ad-
minister as well," 7 especially if there is a statewide sales tax that local-
ities supplement (as is usually the case).
112 Mihir A. Desai & James Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 Nat'l Tax J.
487, 494 (2003) ("Tax systems satisfy capital- ownership neutrality if they do not distort
ownership patterns.").
113 Gruber, note 108, at 273-74; Musgrave & Musgrave, note 108, at 596-97; Wallace E.
Oates, Fiscal Federalism 35 (1972); McLure, note 3, at 343-44; Musgrave, note 3, at 12-13;
352.
114 See Tiebout, note 109, at 416.
115 See Gruber, note 108, at 257.
116 See Joseph Bankman, State Tax Shelters & State Taxation of Capital, 26 Va. Tax Rev.
763, 788 (2009)
117 That is, there are many fewer merchants than consumers and merchants register with
the state and remit sales taxes to the state, and the state then disburses local sales taxes to
local jurisdictions.
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B. The Benefit Principle and Businesses
The benefit principle also indicates a role for the taxation of busi-
nesses. Businesses also benefit from state and local services and re-
quire some increment of additional services beyond what individuals
consume and pay for. Furthermore, to the extent that businesses are
being taxed for the services they consume, then such a taxing scheme
promotes efficiency in the same way that a benefit tax system is effi-
cient as to individuals. 118 Businesses will not shop around for lower
taxes if they perceive the jurisdiction they are in as providing value for
their taxes.
Whether businesses currently get value for their benefit taxes is a
hard question. At least some prominent commentators suggest that
they do not, that in fact taxes levied on businesses subsidize other pro-
grams (say redistribution).1 19 I am not sure about calculations that
show a huge tax burden on businesses because, for instance, many
(most?) business taxes are passed onto individuals.1 20 Leaving this in-
cidence debate to one side, note that taxes (and fees) that hew more
closely to the benefit principle dominate in scale relative to the CIT,
at least in terms of legal incidence. For instance, all business paid
$249.5 billion in property taxes on business property in 2010, about
40% of all state and local business taxes and over five times greater
than the amount corporations paid in state CIT ($44.1 billion).1 21
These numbers are not immediately comparable since many busi-
nesses, say S corporations, that pay the property tax do not pay the
CIT. Yet one may reasonably presume that apportioning corpora-
tions, which pay most of the CIT, also pay a sizable amount of the
property tax. In 2007 it was estimated that large business corpora-
tions, namely those entities most likely to apportion, earned about
60% more income than all small businesses organized as C or S corpo-
rations or partnerships combined. 122 Again, there is no direct connec-
tion between total income and real property ownership, but the
percentage is suggestive. To take another suggestive statistic, in 2009,
apportioning corporations in California represented that they owned
$1.3 trillion in property value in the state, or a bit less than one third
118 Cf. Herwig Schlunk, Why Every State Should Have an Income Tax (And a Retail
Sales Tax Too), 78 Miss. L.J. 637, 641-42 (2009) (similar analysis emphasizing import of the
benefit principle at the state level, including for businesses).
119 Oakland, note 111, at 10; see also McLure, note 3, at 343-44.
120 See text accompanying notes 128-130.
121 Phillips et al., note 18, at 836-37. Similar proportions have long been true. See, e.g.,
Oakland, note 111, at 3 (property taxes accounted for 42.8% of total state and local busi-
ness taxes in 1992).
122 Matthew J. Knittel & Susan C. Nelson, How Would Small Business Owners Fare
Under a Business Entity Tax?, 64 Nat'l Tax J. 949, 956-57 (2011).
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of all property value in the state according to the other state entity
that supervises the collection of property taxes in California. 123 An-
other suggestive data point: Corporations cannot deduct income taxes
in California, 124 and in 2009 corporations filing in California deducted
$200 billion in taxes.125 This number includes not just property taxes,
but also fees, and it only includes corporations that pay tax in Califor-
nia, but it is still many times greater than the total amount corpora-
tions paid in state CIT nationally ($37 billion).
126
Even if this data does demonstrate that corporations pay far more
property tax than CIT, this is only relevant to the question about ben-
efits to the extent that the property tax is a benefit tax, which is at best
only partially true. 127 On the other hand, the property tax was not the
only benefit-type charge paid by corporations; they also paid, for in-
stance, natural resource-type fees. 128 And so the loose upshot is that
apportioning corporations, like all businesses, pay a significant
amount of benefit-type taxation-and before any consideration of the
CIT-and this makes a justification of the CIT as a supplemental ben-
efit tax hard to support. This is especially true given the trend, noted
above, of states using their CITs to better reach importing corpora-
tions through the shift to SSF. If the states are providing an unpaid-
for increment of benefit, then the benefit would most likely be to ex-
porters based in the state, not importers. Furthermore, if there are
such special public amenities, say a training program at a community
college aimed at an industry, then these amenities will often be pro-
vided at the local level, but the CIT is a state-level tax.
129
123 For value of property owned by corporations, see State of Cal., Franchise Tax Bd.,
Table C-5, note 42. For the value of all property, see California Board of Equalization,
Annual Report 2010, tbl.4, available at www.boe.ca.gov/annual/statindex09l0.htm. (total
value approximately $4.4. trillion). Note that how California calculates property value for
purposes of the CIT is different from how it calculates value for purposes of the property
tax. This observer is uncertain as to whether either method is likely to result in consist-
ently higher or lower values.
124 Cal. Rev. & Tax § 24345 (West 2013).
125 State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (2010), Table C-4A, C Corporations: Deductions By
Type, available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFrB/Tax-Statistics/Reports/2010_C-4A-B.
pdf
126 See note 18.
127 See, e.g., Shanske, note 14, at 430.
128 In 2008-09, for instance, about $8 billion in "Sea and inland port facilities" and "Nat-
ural resources" charges was raised by local governments, presumably primarily from
(large) businesses. U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finances by Level of
Government and by State: 2008-09, app., tbl.A-1, available at www2.census.gov/govsflo-
cal09_summary-report.pdf.
129 Cf. Richard M. Bird, A New Look at Local Business Taxes, 30 Tax Notes Int'l 695,
708-09 (May, 19 2003) (arguing that a regional "Business Value Tax" on exports, rather
than imports, is a better benefit tax).
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C. Why Have a CIT If It Is Not Based on Benefits?
The CIT is an income tax and the primary-and traditional-argu-
ment for state income taxes is based on the limitation of the benefit
principle.130 Income taxes, generally based on the ability-to-pay prin-
ciple, are the best means to fund those programs that cannot be ade-
quately paid for with benefit taxes such as, for instance, a court
system, regional infrastructure, and redistribution aimed at those com-
munities that cannot fully fund themselves with benefit taxes.
Is there a justification for taxing the income of corporations beyond
the justification for taxing individual income? Several major ratio-
nales have been offered, and I only touch on a few briefly. 131 Again,
since this Article assumes that the CIT will not disappear anytime
soon at the state or federal levels, the search is for the best justifica-
tion of the state CIT to justify current practices and suggest future
reforms.
First, the most straightforward justification of the CIT is that it is
also consistent with the ability-to-pay principle because corporate
shareholders are more likely to have a greater ability to pay. But is
this true? Do corporate shareholders, the owners of capital, really
bear the burden of the CIT rather than workers and consumers? Pow-
erful arguments exist that owners of capital do not bear the burden of
the CIT in an open economy because they can shift their investments
such that they maintain their returns despite the CIT. 132 Thus, we
might imagine, roughly, that an investor says to local workers that he
will build a factory in your town/state/country only if you accept lower
compensation so that he can achieve at least the same return as he
would in the neighboring competing jurisdiction with no/lower taxes.
The still robust traditional view is that capital is not quite so mobile
and so it is the capital owners who, for example, have already built a
factory, who must bear the tax and then compete for local workers. 133
130 See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Pro-
gressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52
UCLA L. Rev. 1793, 1829-30 (2005) (account of progressive early twentieth century econo-
mists and the birth of the income tax, also noting that these early boosters of the income
tax still see benefit taxes as playing a "subordinate role").
131 See generally Richard M. Bird, Why Tax Corporations? (Int'l Centre for Tax Studies,
U. of Toronto, Working Paper 96-21996, 1996), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collec
tion/F21-4-96-2E.pdf.
132 Shaviro, note 56, at 67-70 (summarizing argument and concluding that the debate on
incidence is "trending strongly toward the view that labor rather than capital bears the
largest share of the burden.").
133 Julie-Anne Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura Power, and Michael Cooper, Distributing
the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury Methodology, (Office of Tax Analysis,
Technical Paper 5, 2012), available at www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/OTA-T2012-05-Distributing-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-Methodol-
ogy-May-2012.pdf (finding 82% of burden on capital and 18% on labor); see also Jane
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Certainly it seems likely that shareholders bear some of the burden
of the CIT sometimes, 134 though arguably this level is lower at the
domestic state level because mobility is higher. 135 Yet even if share-
holders bear the burden of the state CIT, and shareholders are more
affluent, and more progressivity is generally desired, then one may
still ask, loosely following Kaplow, 136 why we should not use the per-
sonal income tax for the purpose of progressivity? In other words,
there are many different kinds of owners of capital, including pension
funds. If we are interested in making our income tax more progres-
sive, then using the CIT is a clumsy way to do it, especially at the state
level. Now, given our politics, it might be among the only ways to
make our tax system more progressive (or prevent it from become less
so), but this is not a very satisfying explanation. Furthermore, if this is
the explanation for the CIT, then it does not give much additional
guidance as to what is to be done with it (except maybe that it should
be retained and maybe increased).
There is a second powerful argument for the CIT, namely that it is
especially useful for regulation. There are relatively few corporations
and they wield enormous power; thus the CIT is a wonderful lever for
governments to use in order to incentivize or discourage certain be-
havior. 137 There is nothing in the argument of this Article that contra-
dicts this line of argument, particularly associated with Reuven Avi-
Yonah. So long as a corporation must pay the CIT based on its sales
into a state, then states will have the same set of incentives (for exam-
ple, credits and deductions) to deploy as they could previously. The
shift to SSF may make individual corporations more or less reachable
Gravelle & Thomas Hungerford, Cong. Research Serv., RL34229, Corporate Tax Reform:
Issues for Congress 1, 15-29 (2011), available at http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/crs-r134
229.pdf.
134 Dave Wildasin has recently argued persuasively that the best way to understand inci-
dence in this context is through a dynamic model; capital is likely to bear initial shocks (for
example, factories are not easily moved), but this burden likely will shift onto others, par-
ticularly workers (for example, a factory is not expanded). David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Com-
petition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and Capital: A Comparative Dynamic Analysis
(Inst. For Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 4463, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1486966; see also Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of
What We Know, 20 Tax Pol'y and the Econ. 1, 40 (2006) ("For a variety of reasons, share-
holders may bear a certain portion of the corporate tax burden.").
135 Robert Cline, Andrew Phillips, Joo Mikim & Tom Neubig, The Economic Incidence
of Additional State Business Taxes, 55 St. Tax Notes 105, 122-23 (Jan. 11, 2010) (finding
relatively low incidence of business taxes in general on owners of capital).
136 Kaplow, note 56, at 237-38.
137 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 Tax L. Rev. 1, 22-25 (2006)
(general argument that the CIT is a useful way for the government to regulate the econ-
omy); Avi-Yonah, note 8 (specific argument, in part based on history of the CIT, that the
CIT is meant to regulate corporations themselves).
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by individual state regulatory regimes, but it is hard to see any particu-
lar way that this shift will impact the regulatory potential of the CIT.
My main concern with the CIT as a tool for regulation is much the
same as it was in connection with the CIT as a tool for redistribution.
First, there is a more direct way for states to give firms incentives-
namely through actual regulations or, when these are not appropriate,
through Pigouvian taxes. 138 Why give a corporation a tax credit to use
clean technology when a state can just mandate clean technology or
tax dirty technology? Second, because states are in greater competi-
tion with one another, their ability to regulate corporate behavior is
less than that of the federal government. All of which is not to deny
the regulatory potential of the CIT, only, again, to observe that this is
a tenuous justification that does not indicate what states should do
with their CITs, except to keep them intact so that corporations will
respond to incentives.
The final, and I think ultimately dominant, argument for the CIT is
that it complements the personal income tax (PIT).139 Suppose there
were no CIT. In that case, a profitable corporation could retain its
profits, never to be taxed. This seems problematic as a matter of fair-
ness (why should some business activity escape taxation?) and effi-
ciency (this would encourage a more-than-optimal amount of profits
to be retained in corporations). This argument can work in reverse.
Suppose many individual shareholders never pay PIT on their share of
corporate profits, then the CIT makes certain that corporate profits
are at least taxed once.
As with the other rationales for the CIT, this Article's argument
does not impact the PIT-CIT complement argument directly. As with
the regulation argument, it is hard to see how a CIT apportioned by
sales nationally is less functional as a complement. Yet note that the
arguments for the PIT-CIT complement argument are weak. First, as
with the other rationales, there is a more direct way to proceed,
namely we can tax individuals on their corporate income directly
138 One might object (and commentators have objected) that it is ironic, at best, that I
object to these other theories of the CIT on the basis of indirection when the whole argu-
ment of this Article is that the state CIT can indirectly serve as a complement to the RST;
the direct route to superior consumption taxation is simple, namely broaden the base of
the RST. Note, however, that the already narrow base of the RST has only been narrow-
ing, whereas, as a matter of fact, we have seen new regulations on corporations, which
suggests that there are more politically available substitutes for the CIT as regulator com-
pared to the CIT as RST complement. Furthermore, using the CIT to regulate is primarily
to use carrots (that is, subsidies) versus sticks, which may make political sense, but is gener-
ally not ideal. See generally Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and
Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 797 (2012). Thus using the CIT
to dole out subsidies when regulations seem politically plausible is doubly unfortunate.
139 See, e.g., Bird, note 131, at 9; Shaviro, note 56, at 15.
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whether or not disbursed. 140 Furthermore, not all corporations retain
their profits, and not all shareholders avoid paying their share of cor-
porate profits-and thus in many cases the CIT is not so much com-
plementing the PIT but, per its critics, double taxing certain forms of
income.'
41
Ultimately, there are several nonbenefit arguments in favor of a
CIT. None of these reasons (nor others) appears to be a knockdown
on their own, but in aggregate they are important. Yet they are not
benefit rationales for the CIT and this absence is of particular impor-
tance to the question of whether states should levy CITs.
D. The Particular Problem of a State CIT
At best, the argument for the CIT on benefit grounds is attenuated
since it is unclear just how significant an increment of benefit is pro-
vided to the corporation beyond the benefits that individuals receive,
and it is even less clear whether this increment is not adequately taxed
through property (and related) taxes. Yet, pragmatically, the question
for the states is not whether or not there is some untaxed increment of
benefit, but whether or not it is worthwhile for states to attempt to tax
corporations for this benefit on the basis of net income given the diffi-
culties of taxing large profitable corporations, which tend to be sophis-
ticated and mobile. The familiar analysis, outlined generally above,
goes roughly as follows.
If I, as an individual, get a clear benefit from my property taxes,
then I am unlikely to move because I am getting what I paid for, espe-
cially given that I, like most individuals, have lots of subjective reasons
not to move. In theory a situation could be reached where every indi-
vidual is pleased with the tax-local amenity bundle they receive and
would then stay put, with their local taxes paying for the services that
they want.
Large corporations, unlike individuals, may be presumed to have an
easier time moving, especially if the benefits provided by a jurisdiction
benefit the corporation in an attenuated way (for example, adequate
court system). 142 Corporations may thus play jurisdictions off each
other to lower their tax burden even if eventually this tax competition
will undermine the benefits that the corporations ultimately require.
This dynamic might make state-level CITs something of an anti-bene-
fit tax because, given the weak connection between marginal tax and
140 Avi-Yonah, note 8, at 1202-03.
141 I return to the issue of double taxation in Section III.E.1.
142 Cf. Bankman, note 116, at 785-86 (2007) (explaining how corporate mobility leads to
significant tax competition among states).
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benefit, corporations will play jurisdictions against each other until the
actual benefits that corporations would want are whittled away.
Now, this is not to say that corporations thus end up paying no
taxes, especially a benefit-type levy like the property tax. Rather, this
analysis emphasizes that because the state CIT is not tied tightly to
state benefits-and even if the CIT is justified for other reasons-the
CIT base is going to be challenging for states to sustain in a competi-
tive economy. We have already gotten a sense of how complicated it
is to levy a state CIT; consider, for example, the issues with apportion-
ment. We also know that state CIT collections are volatile, indeed
generally pro-cyclical, and have been in decline. 143 Given all this, why
not just drop the CIT altogether?
E. The Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement
Maybe the state CIT should be dropped, but this will not happen
because of politics. For all their limitations, voters seem unwilling to
accept that the CIT is just not worth it.144 The voters might even be
correct in their presumed intuition that the CIT is a progressive tax.
Furthermore, as shown in Part II, several recent trends in the CIT
have been positive. Nevertheless, the reasoning justifying these vari-
ous trends is ad hoc (at best) and does not always suggest next steps,
much less any theoretical reasons to take these next steps given how
difficult it is for states to maintain CITs (versus other taxes).
This Article argues that the state CIT is a relatively strong comple-
ment to a state tax with a stronger justification, the state RST. This
argument suggests clear reforms to the state CIT and perhaps even
that, under current conditions, the CIT should be retained (even if it
were possible to eliminate it). By contrast, the usual argument for the
CIT is that it is a (weak) complement to the personal income tax. De-
veloping a new general argument requires a little more background.
1. Tax Complements in General
Whenever the government taxes an activity, the general assumption
is that individual taxpayers will do that activity less. What follows
from this is if the government chooses to tax a particularly foolish
base, then it might well collect little or nothing while distorting private
decisions. To take a famous example: In 1696, the king of England
opted to tax homes based on how many windows they had on the
143 See Phillips, et al., note 10, at 842.
144 Cf. Bird, note 129, at 698 (explaining how public opinion in most countries is greatly
in support of a business tax).
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theory that windows were a proxy for wealth. 145 And so, buildings
were built with fewer (or no) windows; existing windows were
blocked.1 46 The government raised little money with this tax and
caused great inconvenience and waste of resources-a lose-lose situa-
tion called, appropriately, "deadweight loss." The primary driver of
the deadweight loss is the "substitution effect"-taxpayers are substi-
tuting untaxed walls for taxed windows. 147
Deadweight loss can be avoided if the government taxes something
one cannot substitute away from-say one's existence (for example,
everyone pays $10,000)-but such taxes would be perceived as obvi-
ously unfair, and so governments try to tax hard-to-substitute things,
like income, but accept that there will be some deadweight loss.
This issue of the optimal design of a tax given the substitution effect
brings us perilously close to the income tax-consumption tax debate
and particularly the question of taxing investment income. Fortu-
nately there is no need to go further. The question is, given that we
are taxing a given base, what should the tax look like? For instance,
should we tax only some consumption? The standard answer is to tax
as broadly as possible so as to avoid deadweight loss. Taxing narrowly
was part of the problem with the window tax; a better tax would have
been a tax on property generally and the best tax of all would have
been just on the land. One cannot produce less land, though one
could allow one's building on the land to deteriorate (that is, substi-
tute away from the property value subject to tax).148
What about double taxing some consumption or income? The anal-
ysis is the same because it is the same issue; we should not double tax
only some activities because double taxing affects relative prices in the
same way as taxing only some activities once. That is, if we had a land
tax and a window tax then we would expect much the same substitu-
tion effect as when there is only a window tax, that is, people would
still substitute away from windows.
We live in a world of multiple tax bases. Partially this is just a mat-
ter of history, politics, and law, but this also makes sense given the
theory of tax assignment. That is, for example, we want the central
government to rely on a broad-based income (or consumption) tax to
145 Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 369-71 (8th ed. 2008).
146 Id.
147 My focus here, as is standard, is on the substitution effect and not on the income
effect. For sake of rigor, we can assume that all tax dollars are returned to the taxpayers,
but that they still have incentive to avoid the taxed activity because it has become relatively
more expensive. See Gruber, note 108, at 619-20; David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doc-
trine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627, 1653-55 (1999).
148 Cf. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Simple Analytics of Land Value
Taxation, in Land Value Taxation: Theory, Evidence, and Practice 51, 58 (Richard F. Dye
& Richard W. England eds., 2009).
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fund national public goods while local governments rely on real prop-
erty taxes for local public goods.
Ideally, the relationship between these various taxes would be ei-
ther attenuated or complementary. By attenuated, I mean that the
two taxes are related in a way that a taxpayer would not substitute
away from both taxes at the same time, amplifying the impact. If the
government taxes chocolate but not vanilla, then I may buy more va-
nilla, but the chocolate tax is unlikely to impact my decisions related
to property taxes even though there is an attenuated way in which the
merchant's property tax is built into the cost of chocolate, and my
property tax is to some extent related to the pleasing amenity of a
local chocolate store. From the perspective of a government looking
to raise revenue, adding a property tax to a chocolate tax thus makes
sense because the new property tax is unlikely to have much impact
on the chocolate tax one way or another.149 By contrast, a tax on
chocolate added to a tax on sweets would probably yield the govern-
ment little money, as both taxes encourage substitution away from
chocolate. 150 Put another way, the new tax on chocolate on top of the
tax on sweets is creating double taxation whereas the tax on real prop-
erty is not causing substantive double taxation through its interaction
with the tax on chocolate.
Yet two different tax bases can interact in a complementary manner
so as to only tax a given item of income (or asset or transaction) once.
Return to the traditional theory of the CIT. If a profitable corpora-
tion paid CIT on its profits and then paid out all its profits in divi-
dends to individuals, and those individuals paid income tax on those
dividends, then all the profits would be taxed twice. Because of the
substitution effect this double taxation looks inefficient. Yet corpora-
tions do not have to distribute their profits to their shareholders; they
can retain them at the corporate level. Thus, without the CIT, such
nondisbursed profits might not even be taxed once-thereby, by
means of the substitution effect, encouraging exactly such nondisbur-
sement even when the money would be better allocated if returned to
shareholders. Thus, arguably, the CIT does not so much double tax
149 1 take this to be a partial restatement-and oversimplification-of Chris Sanchirico's
argument. Sanchirico, note 106, at 150 ("[If a tax system excludes a particular attribute
from the tax base, then no matter how well-designed that tax system may otherwise be, it is
nearly always possible to add that attribute to the base in such a manner as to increase at
least one of revenue, efficiency, or equity without suffering a reduction in either of the
other two."); id. at 193 (giving an example of two taxes, both to some extent taxing labor,
reducing total revenue because of amplified substitution effects).
150 Of course, we might want this substitution away-for example, cigarette taxes on top
of general RSTs. This is also an example of heavier taxes being placed on consumables
that people are less likely to substitute away from (because they are addictive, which is one
reason we would not mind if people did substitute away).
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corporate profits as complement the PIT, ensuring that corporate
profits are taxed at least once.
2. Bringing It All Together
Again, this Article does not dispute that the CIT may have a role to
play as a complement to PITs. Yet this argument, and others on be-
half of the CIT, are weak, especially as to state CITs. The new argu-
ment of this Article is that the new state CIT is complementary to a
particular state tax, the RST, and can be more so. When I purchase a
service from a profitable service corporation I do not pay sales tax,
but, following McLure, the corporation pays the CIT in proportion to
the sales it makes to me in my state (if my state uses SSF).151 Thus the
state CIT is complementing the RST, ensuring that all transactions are
taxed once, making the state consumption tax base more efficient.
An example: Suppose my state's RST is 10% and its CIT is also
10% (and the rates do tend to be close). On my $100 purchase of
services from a corporation, I should, according to the best theory of
the sales tax, pay $10 in RST, but I do not. Suppose that the corpora-
tion was going to make $1 billion in profits regardless, and so my addi-
tional purchase of $100 of services in my state means that my state can
tax an additional $100 of this corporation's income, yielding $10 in
taxes. Suppose as well that the corporation manages to impose the
cost of this tax on to me, the consumer, just as it does for the RST. If
all these assumptions are true, then the CIT has contributed to taxing
my consumption of services exactly once.
But do corporations-can corporations-pass the cost of the CIT
on to consumers so that the incidence of a CIT apportioned according
to an SSF approximates an RST? After all, as noted above there are
strong arguments that the CIT's economic burden falls on sharehold-
ers and/or labor. Most studies of incidence focus on the question of
progressivity and the question of capital versus labor and do not break
out the role of consumers.1 52 Yet if the CIT is wholly imposed on the
151 See McLure, note 48, at 341-42.
152 For example, see Li Liu & Rosanne Altshuler, Passing It On: The Incidence of the
Corporate Income Tax Under Imperfect Competition, at *1 (2011), http://www.eea-esem.
com/files/papers/eea-esemi/2011/1257/rev2.pdf ("The conventional wisdom holds that own-
ers of capital bear most of the burden of the corporate income taxes. But the economic
incidence of the corporate income tax suggests that the corporate income tax can be shifted
to various candidates including investors, workers, and consumers. In particular, the bur-
den of the corporate income tax can fall on labor."). Wise interlocutors (in particular,
David Wildasin) have suggested to me in conversation that this relative indifference to the
question of employees versus consumers is in part because of the substantial overlap of
employees and consumers and that, regardless of which of these two groups bears the
incidence, what is key is that it is not the owners of capital.
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basis of sales into a state, then the mechanism by which the CIT can
be imposed on labor is more attenuated and the argument that con-
sumers or owners of capital bear the burden of the tax seems more
relevant. As shown above, it is more likely that owners of capital can
avoid the burden of the state CIT in the U.S. domestic context and so
there is a particularly strong argument that corporations will push the
cost of the CIT on to consumers, much like a sales tax. And, as to the
sales tax, the literature is quite strong in concluding that it is the con-
sumers who bear the incidence.'
53
This can be illustrated with an example. Take two competing corpo-
rations selling into California. One produces its product in California
and the other in Nevada; California has the CIT and Nevada does not,
but California now uses a SSF. So long as both corporations sell a
sufficient number of goods, then both have nexus to California 154 and
both have to pay California CIT in proportion to their California
sales. Both corporations have incentive to pass the same cost on to
consumers and will do so if the competitive situation allows for it, just
as with an RST. It is no longer the case, as under the traditional
formula, that the California firm is competing with a Nevada firm that
does not pay CIT to the extent of its payroll and property in Nevada.
In a scenario under the traditional three-factor formula, where a cor-
poration pays CIT in proportion to its payroll, it makes sense to imag-
ine that the California firm, in order to compete on price, might lower
its wages. 155
Now, there are reasons to believe that labor may still bear a portion
of the state CIT even if all states shift to SSF. Imagine the Nevada
firm does not need to pay CIT to California-perhaps because it is not
a corporation, perhaps because it does not sell very much, perhaps
because it is not very profitable, or perhaps because it can avail itself
of Public Law 86-272. In any of these cases, the California corpora-
tion will be looking to cut its own costs in order to keep pace with the
competition (or, the shareholders may need to accept a lower return).
To the extent that the CIT, even with SSF, still behaves like an income
tax (versus a consumption tax), then the argument of this Article is
153 See, e.g., James M. Poterba, Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and Local
Sales Taxes, 49 Nat'l Tax J. 165, 173 (1996) (finding most of RST passed on to consumers).
154 Bracketing Public Law 86-272 or supposing the Nevada firm has a wholly-owned
marketing subsidiary in California.
155 Note also that, at least in theory, the shift to the SSF is exporting CIT burden on to
the workers and shareholders of other states. To return to the example, the Nevada corpo-
ration must now pay more in California CIT under the SSF. Cf. David E. Wildasin, State
Corporation Income Taxation: An Economic Perspective on Nexus, 63 Nat'l Tax J. 903,
919-20 (2010) (noting that a state CIT using SSF is "an implicit tariff on imports from other
states").
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weakened. I return to the details of this important issue in Section
Iv.C.
Another strong qualification can be noted, namely that if the CIT
with SSF does fully get reflected in prices, then that still impacts labor
because now the CIT is generally increasing the price level, thereby
decreasing the returns to wages (generally though and not in only one
corporation). Put another way, if the CIT does function as an RST
complement, then it is complementing a tax, the sales tax, that is not
progressive.
In concluding this Section, I want to re-emphasize the larger theo-
retical framework. The traditional theory of tax assignment at most
tepidly justifies state-level CITs in theory and wonders quite cogently
whether they are worth it in practice. The case for state-level RSTs is
stronger than the stand-alone argument for a CIT and, if one is to
have an RST, then it is generally agreed that it should be as broad as
possible. As a complement to the state RST, the state CIT thus has an
additional justification so long as the RST is narrow in a manner that
the CIT can ameliorate. Furthermore, this rationale provides a uni-
fied justification for recent changes to the CIT (for example, the shift
to SSF and the destination principle) and points towards additional
reforms that can make the CIT still better as an RST complement.
IV. OBJECTIONS
Suppose it is granted that the CIT can serve as a complement to the
RST; there remain some important objections.
A. Pyramiding/Cascading
One of the main critiques of the RST is that the total sales tax paid
on a final item of consumption is related to the number of transactions
that went into creating the sale to begin with.156 So assume I start a
small restaurant and pay $1000 for napkins and pay 10% RST on the
purchase, or $100. When I sell you a meal for $10, I will need to
charge you sales tax (10% of $10 = $1) plus some portion of the sales
tax I already paid on the napkins (say $0.10). This means that you are
essentially paying more in sales tax for your meal relative to a
purchase of other goods directly (for which you pay sales tax once, not
sales tax on sales tax). Even worse, a large chain that makes its own
napkins does not have to pay sales tax at all on its purchase of this
business input, meaning that it can charge less than I can, thereby
gaining a competitive advantage.
156 See Ring, note 65, at 79.
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States try to limit the extent of pyramiding in the RST by allowing
for resale exemptions, but these are not viewed as terribly effective.
157
The new improved CIT does not replace the RST and does not make
the RST better as to pyramiding. Indeed, the new CIT makes things
worse to the extent that now services, in effect, would be subject to
sales tax. Thus the CIT on my purchase of equipment repair for my
restaurant 158 would also be built into my final prices even though it
would not be built into the prices of my larger rival who can do the
repairs in-house. If this magnification of pyramiding is a serious
enough problem, then this counsels against using the CIT as a fallback
to the RST.
There are several reasons to think the CIT will not aggravate
pyramiding very much. First, because the CIT is based on income, not
the value of the total sale like the RST, the amount of the pyramiding
will (necessarily) be less because a corporation's profit is less than its
gross receipts, especially assuming other corporate efforts to minimize
taxable income.159
Second, deductibility is a rough and imperfect parallel to resale cer-
tificates when one is considering a net income tax.' 60 That is, a subse-
quent purchaser in the value chain can deduct the higher costs of
products with a built-in CIT. Deductibility, however, mitigates the
CIT only to the extent of the subsequent purchaser's tax rate. So, if
the CIT rate is 10%, then only 10% of the added costs of the CIT
(assuming one intermediary) is recouped by the next purchaser,
meaning it would still make sense for a purchaser to choose a supplier
who does not have the CIT built into the price for its products. If,
however, the CIT can be wholly passed on to consumers, then this is
not an issue for the corporate taxpayer. Furthermore, if, as is the case,
most states have CITs in a similar range and with a similar design,
then there is limited ability to find a corporation that does not have
the CIT built in to its prices. Indeed, with the correct nexus standard,
then any corporation that is going to sell a service with substantial
economic value into California is going to need to pay the same CIT
on the basis of its sales into California, and thus all such corporations
will have the CIT built into their prices.
157 It is commonly claimed that approximately 40% of the RST is nevertheless raised
from sales of business inputs. See, e.g., id. at 82-88.
158 If the service is bought from a multistate corporation. If, by contrast, the service were
purchased from a local sole proprietor, then this argument would not apply because the
service firm would not be subject to CIT, much less SSF.
159 This also indicates that CITs are not perfect complements to RSTs.
160 This analysis is loosely drawn from McLure, note 16, at 760-61; McIntyre & Pomp,
note 49, at 1288-90.
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In the end, working from first principles (versus empirics), the new
CIT as RST complement aggravates pyramiding to the extent it now
includes, by design, more transactions than before. Given the likely
mitigation noted above, the question is whether it is still worth it to
reach untaxed sales? I think the answer is yes, especially if, as noted
below, state CITs are reformed with this issue in mind. It also should
be noted that I am discussing tweaks to an imperfect tax that already
exists.
B. Business Form
Not every business pays the CIT, for example, not partnerships, and
so some firms do not have the CIT built into their prices (though per-
haps these businesses build in the PIT paid by their ultimate own-
ers). 161 Moreover, only multistate corporations have their net income
apportioned, and so an in-state corporation would have all of its net
income subject to the CIT. Thus significant elements of the business
tax base are not affected by the changes listed above that make the
CIT more of a complement to the RST.
These are especially big problems to the extent the proposal is to
replace the RST (and the PIT) altogether, but that is not the proposal
here and thus the problem is not as severe. If these other business
entities sell tangible personal property, then they are subject to the
RST. And, even if not, the ultimate owners of these entities will still
pay the PIT on their profits, which might well be a greater liability
than the CIT.1
62
Nevertheless, this is a clear limitation in using the CIT as a comple-
ment to the RST; there is no good reason, for instance, why the CIT
should complement the RST only as to the transactions of multistate
corporations. There is, however, also no policy reason that a new bus-
iness activity tax cannot be extended to all businesses, as proposed
recently in California,'163 was briefly the case in Michigan, 164 and is still
the case in Washington, Ohio, New Hampshire, and Texas.
165 Of
course, the Michigan saga demonstrates that there are political rea-
sons why expanding the CIT in this way may be a nonstarter; I address
this issue in Section V.A.
161 But see note 12 (discussing the qualifications to the effect that some pass-through
income is ultimately apportioned).
162 Some of these entities collect the RST and their owners pay the PIT, which indicates
the extent to which tweaking the CIT is a third-best solution in a fourth-best world.
163 Cal. Comm'n on the 21st Century Economy, note 58, at 44-46.
164 McIntyre & Pomp, note 49, at 1315.
165 Phillips et al., note 10, at 837.
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C. Diversity of Business Profitability and Location
A related and complex worry involves the diversity in ways in which
a firm may experience the new CIT. McLure observed long ago that
different firms with different apportionment factors and profit struc-
tures will experience the CIT as an RST to differing extents, although
he also indicated, tersely, that this ought not to be a major concern. 166
Susan Morse recently elaborated on this diversity. 167 In what follows,
I further elaborate and illustrate their analyses in order to demon-
strate that deeper consideration of firm diversity actually makes the
argument of this Article more compelling.
Imagine a simple scenario. Corporation X makes $90 million of its
total $100 million in sales into California, for an SSF of 90%. Corpo-
ration X has net income of $20 million and, assuming a CIT rate of
10%, Corporation X will owe California $1.8 million ($20 million *
90% * 10%). Now Corporation X makes a new sale of $1 million into
California, and assume it consists of pure profits. When this sale is
completed, X Co. will have $21 million in profits and California will
have an SSF of 90.10% ($91 million/$101 million). California will now
be able to collect $1,892,079 in CIT from X Co. or $92,079 more on
new sales of $1 million or about 9%. Looked at this way, the CIT is
operating quite a bit like a complement to the RST.
This is not, however, the right way to look at it. Assume that Cali-
fornia only used the property factor and so this new sale did not im-
pact its apportionment factor at all. Now we would just multiply the
old factor (90%) by the new profits ($21 million) and arrive at a CIT
liability of $1,890,000-only $2079 less than when California switched
to the SSF. Why is this so? Because Corporation X makes almost all
of its sales in California, it will pay about the same amount on new
profits wherever they are earned. The CIT is acting mostly as an in-
come tax on Corporation X; the shift to the sales factor only contrib-
uted 2% to the increase in tax revenue to California ($2079/$92,079).
And so the CIT in this case is only being experienced as a sales tax to
a trivial extent.
Contrast Y Co. Corporation Y also earns $20 million on $100 mil-
lion in sales, but only 10% of its sales are in California. Accordingly,
Corporation Y's CIT liability to California, again assuming a 10%
rate, will be $200,000 (10% * 10% * $20 million). Assume again $1
million of new net income from sales in California. California's SSF
will now grow to 10.89% ($11 million/$101 million). Multiplying this
new SSF by this new higher profit margin yields California $228,713-
a gain of $28,713. But this entire gain is not caused by the new single
166 McLure, note 48, at 333-34.
167 Morse, note 51, at 609-13.
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sales factor. Using the old sales factor, 10%, revenues have increased
anyway by $10,000 (10% SSF * new net income of $1 million), and the
remaining $18,000 or 65% of the new liability, is caused by the shift in
sales.
The relationship between Corporations X and Y indicates two inter-
esting phenomena. First, the higher a state's apportionment factor,
however calculated, the higher the proportion of net income from a
new sale that a state will get to include in its CIT base. Second, how-
ever, the higher a state's apportionment factor vis a vis a corporation,
the greater percentage of the new net income that the state would
have gained in any event, SSF or some other formula. The following
chart, illustrates these two relationships.
FIGURE 4
Relationship Between Apportionment and CIT
Acting as RST
But how should we envision most corporations? Are they more like
Corporation X or Corporation Y? Returning to Figure 1 we should
remember that the average SSF in the nation's most populous state,
California, was only once briefly above 10% over the last twenty-five
years and yet the SSF was much lower for the past ten years (around
6%). We should generally expect most corporations to resemble Cor-
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poration Y in its SSF and thus that a CIT with SSF behaves more like
an RST than a CIT.
This conclusion is reinforced if we consider Corporation Z. Corpo-
ration Z is just like Corporation Y; it has a 10% SSF in California and
earns $20 million on $100 million in sales nationally. The only differ-
ence is that, as to the new $1 million in sales in California, Corpora-
tion Z will only enjoy $100,000 in net income, for a more generally
realistic return of 10%. What happens to Corporation Z's CIT liabil-
ity to California? It began, as with Y's, at $200,000, but it is now
$218,889 (10.89% * $20,100,000 * 10%). If not for SSF, how much
would Corporation Z owe California? Only $201,000 or (10% * 10%
* $20.1 million)-and so almost 95% of Corporation Z's higher liabil-
ity to California is attributed to its new sales in California and not to
its higher profits. This makes sense because, compared to Corpora-
tion Y, it earned far less net income from these sales. This relation-
ship is captured in the following chart:
FIGURE 5
Relationship of Marginal Profitability to CIT
Acting as RST
Corporation Y has a 10% SSF but makes 100% profit on its sale and so I
about 65% of its increase in tax liability is attributed to the sale versus
90% - its profit. Corporation Z only earns 10% profits on its sale and so




If most corporations bave an SSF below 20%
and are earning returns of less than 20%, then I
50%_ firms experience over 80% of any
increase in their CIT as resulting from the
increase in sales.
40%'
010% Net Income I
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Are most apportioning corporations like Corporation Y or Corpo-
ration Z? Nationally, the rate of corporate profitability has ranged
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from 4% to 12% for fifty years.168 Given these historic rates of re-
turn, it seems clear that most firms' rate of return is, on average, lower
than 20%. Combining this with the related insight into apportionment
factors, one can conclude that the new CIT is experienced primarily as
a sales tax for most corporations. That is, marginal increases in the
CIT are tied more to sales than to income. This is important for sev-
eral reasons. First, although there is surely a diversity among corpora-
tions-especially perhaps if there is a great deal of tax planning-
there is good reason to believe that most firms will experience the new
CIT in a similar manner, as a kind of sales tax, and hence as an RST
complement given the peculiar structures of SSFs and RSTs. Second,
as a tax on sales, there is good reason to believe that the evidence that
suggests that the RST is passed forward to consumers should be true
of the new CIT as well.
Third, as to Corporation Z, which is the most typical, its CIT liabil-
ity increased by about $18,000 in connection with $1 million in sales.
Now, 95% of that increase was due to the increase in sales, but
$18,000 is just 18% of the RST that should have been collected if the
RST was at the same rate as the CIT (10% in the example, resulting in
a $100,000 liability). This is a reminder that the complementing is not
perfect. As noted above, one somewhat ironic upside is that the new
CIT is not going to cause pyramiding to the same extent as an RST.
D. Isn't the New CIT Just, Well, a Corporate Income Tax?
Morse has raised the following question: If all states moved to a
uniform SSF, then will the CIT not be acting like an additional na-
tional tax on corporate income? 169 The answer is "yes, but . .. ."
First, from a state's perspective this national CIT would still apportion
income to a state based on its provision of a market, and, this could be
significant. 170 Second, also from a state's perspective, so long as the
nexus rules for the CIT are more generous than the rules governing
the RST, more transactions are apportioned to market states than oth-
erwise (for example, California can tax Amazon on its profits in Cali-
fornia). Third, this broadening impact is especially relevant, if, as is
168 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, National Data app. D, at D-62 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2012/01 %2OJanuary/D%20Pages/O112dpg__d.pdf. The margins
that can be extracted based on California's CIT data are in a similar range. Cf. James M.
Poterba, The Rate of Return to Corporate Capital and Factor Shares: New Estimates Us-
ing Revised National Income Accounts and Capital Stock Data, 48 Carnegie-Rochester
Conf. Series on Pub. Pol'y 211, 238 (1998) (finding pretax rates of return of about 8.5%
from 1959 to 1996).
169 And with all the weaknesses that national CITs exhibit in the international arena.
See Morse, note 51, at 636-39.
170 See Section IV.C.
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also the case, the sales apportioned to a state include sales (such as
intangibles) that otherwise would not be subject to the RST (for ex-
ample, profits on the downloads of iTunes). Of course, if these legal
absurdities were removed, then the new state CIT would just be a
national CIT based on SSF, and the question would become, again,
whether it makes sense to have a state-level CIT.
V. WAYS FORWARD
Simply offering a better theory of the CIT is only of intellectual
interest if it does not also indicate what policymakers should do. Yet
the CIT as RST complement points to initiatives that should be under-
taken. I begin with those initiatives that are already familiar; note
that these initiatives can now be unified by the new theory of the CIT
proposed herein. I then move to a set of novel reforms suggested by
this new unified theory of the CIT.
A. Reforms Already Found in the Literature
Viewing the CIT as backup to the RST indicates a variety of actions
that might be taken to allow it to better play this role. First, the posi-
tive trends outlined above should be continued. Specifically, the
thorny question of whether the SSF really delivers economic growth
should not be allowed to derail the national move to SSF-with in-
tangibles and services apportioned on a destination basis.
Second, states that have not been collecting CIT from online firms
like Amazon should do so. Amazon would appear to have nexus with
California, for instance, for purposes of the state CIT and should be
required to pay CIT based on its sales in California.
Third, the regular proposals to enlarge Public Law 86-272, which
would undermine the state CIT further, are unhelpful. 171 The broader
nexus now often in use for the state CIT, based on significant eco-
nomic presence, is the appropriate standard for the modern econ-
omy-expanding Quill would be retrograde. 172
Fourth, I think there might be room in state political discourse for
broadening the number of businesses subject to the CIT. Ideally, it
would be all business activity paying the tax so as to prevent distor-
tions as to different kinds and sizes of businesses, but voters have a
hard time accepting that a tax with legal incidence on businesses
171 See, e.g., Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 1439, 112th Cong.
(2011).
172 Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State
Taxation: A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 31 St. Tax Notes 721, 733-35 (Mar. 1,
2004).
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should be levied when that business is not profitable. 173 So we need to
keep the CIT an income tax.174 Voters with some justification also
have difficulty accepting additional taxes on small businesses. 175 Thus
there could be a bright-line rule, perhaps similar to the rules establish-
ing taxpayer nexus, such that only larger noncorporate businesses
have to pay the CIT.' 76 The California data indicates that apportion-
ing corporations, which I presume are larger, pay the overwhelming
majority of CIT.177 Nationally, Matthew Knittel and Susan Nelson
found that small businesses, although a large majority of entities, re-
port a minority of net income, less than 20%, and so there is not a big
revenue loss suffered if small businesses are taken out of the proposed
large business entity income tax.
178
The impact of base-broadening reforms could be mitigated-for in-
stance, by offering credits as described in the next Section or even
lowering the overall CIT rate. Furthermore, as critics of SSF have
noted, the shift to SSF does appear to reduce state CIT collections,
179
which suggests that making this rational reform also provides a tax
break to many taxpayers. Thus the move to broaden the CIT base
could be part of a reform package that would be revenue neutral or
even reduced taxes. After all, the reforms proposed here are not
meant to raise revenue in any direct sense; rather, they are meant to
rationalize the state CIT as part of state revenue systems. That said,
173 Michigan's experience is illustrative. See Hill, note 20, at 856 (quoting Michael
Mazerov, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, who emphasized the political resistance
in Michigan to a general business tax on corporations that are not profitable).
174 There is another reason that the CIT must remain an income tax and that is that it is
only because it is an income tax that most states' courts have found that the CIT is not
constrained by the Quill physical presence rule, which has (so far) been limited to the sales
and use tax (in some states). See Haile, note 31, at 1835.
175 See, e.g., Issues-Taxes, NFIB (last visited Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.nfib.comladvo
cacy/taxes (advocating for continued low tax rates on small businesses to promote reinvest-
ment, growth, and job creation). To the extent that the CIT is a benefit tax on top of other
benefit levies, then size seems an appropriate proxy for this extra benefit. See Oakland &
Testa, note 111, at 6. And, if the CIT is a tax levied on ability-to-pay principles, one may
feel that size is an appropriate proxy for that as well.
176 For instance, as of January 1, 2012, an entity whose "total revenue from its entire
business is less than or equal to $1 million" is not liable for the new Texas Margin Tax. Tex.
Tax Code Ann. § 171.002(d)(2) (West 2012).
177 See Subsection II.B.1.
178 Knittel & Nelson, note 122, at 958. Note that, in line with several Code provisions,
Knittel and Nelson use a $10 million total income limit to define a small business, which
means that their figures capture many more entities than a $1 million limit like Texas. See
id. This means that Texas is losing even less revenue; it also means that a state would not
lose much revenue if it increased the threshold higher than $1 million for practical and/or
political reasons.
179 See, e.g., Michael Mazerov, Ctr. on Budget & Pol'y Priorities, The "Single Sales Fac-
tor" Formula for State Corporate Taxes: A Boon to Economic Development or a Costly
Giveaway? 11-12 (Sept. 2005), http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-27-Olsfp.pdf.
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as explored further below, these reforms could be revenue-enhancing,
which makes sense because a more efficient tax allows the govern-
ment to raise more money with less deadweight loss.
B. New Reforms to Make the CIT a Better RST Complement
Assuming the CIT is-or can-(roughly) complement the RST, es-
pecially if the above reforms are undertaken, the next step is how to
refine this complementary role. Consider the analogy to the CIT-PIT
relationship. We want the CIT to apply only when corporations retain
earnings and the PIT to apply only when the earnings are distributed.
Similarly, we want the CIT to apply only to those sales not already
covered by the RST. Moving towards this superior complementarity
requires two steps. First, we should reduce the CIT burden on firms
that collect the RST. Second, we ought to consider the role of firms
that do not collect the RST, and should not collect it, and thus are not
a central concern of the new CIT.
1. First Step: Give a Credit to Firms that Remit the RST
The proposal is to have the CIT make some allowance for those
taxpayers that do collect the RST and also pay the CIT (that is, for
Barnes & Noble versus Amazon or a national law firm). For example,
as discussed above, in 2008-2009 California collected about 40% of its
CIT from corporations in industries that likely do not, speaking
broadly, collect the RST (for example, professional services), but ide-
ally should on sales to consumers. 180 California, however, also col-
lected almost $1 billion in CIT from corporations in industries (retail)
that do collect the RST (at least if they are also physically in-state).18 '
And so one proposal is to provide a partial CIT credit to firms that
collect the RST (or use tax). 8 2
Recall that the CIT is probably not reaching the special benefits a
corporation, as a corporation, receives nor that the CIT is a strong
tool for redistribution or regulation. Without eschewing these goals
altogether-or directly frustrating them-the goal is to make the CIT
180 See Figures 2 & 3.
181 See Figure 3 (10% of California CIT collected from retail firms in 2008). California
collected over $9 billion in CIT in 2008. Table C-2, Corporation Tax, Synopsis of Tax Lia-
bility Calculations, All Corporations, State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. (2010), available at
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/aboutFTB/TaxStatistics/Reports/BusinessEntities/2009_C-2.pdf
182 Note that there could be other more refined proposals, as noted to me by another
astute observer. For instance, firms could be asked to separate the sales on which they
collected RST from the sales on which they did not. The RST sales, for instance, could be
excluded from the SSF altogether or the credit could be keyed to only the RST sales; all
such options are well worth considering.
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a better complement to the RST by limiting a firm's CIT burden if it is
remitting the RST. Thus the credit should not be too large or it would
vitiate the CIT entirely, both as to its other functions, for example,
regulation, but also as to the function proposed herein, namely as RST
complement. After all, it is inherent to the theory of the CIT offered
here that it is mostly paid by consumers, much like an RST. And, if
consumers are not bearing the CIT, then it is likely that it is employ-
ees who are and not shareholders.
Nevertheless, a small credit towards the firm's tax burden, in the-
ory, can go a long way-imagine a credit equal to .25% of receipts
remitted to the State. In 2008, about $40 billion in RST was collected
in California. 183 The .25% rate amounts to a maximum of $100 mil-
lion in credits, which is actually over 10% of the amount of CIT that
retail corporations paid in 2008 and so it is not insignificant. 8 4 Since
RST is remitted even by firms that are not profitable (or not very
profitable), it makes sense for this credit to be at least partially
refundable. 8 5
In California, and many other states, the way to institute this reform
is relatively clear. 186 California's RST is formally a gross receipts tax
on all firms (that can be passed on to consumers). 8 7 Therefore, there
183 California, Board of Equalization, Annual Report 2008-2009, tbl.2, http://www.boe.
ca.gov/annual/statindex0809.htm. This rate is only a hypothetical. It might make sense to
raise the credit rate, especially if the overall CIT rate is increased at the same time. There
is evidence that firms will respond negatively to a higher CIT rate and this will to some
extent dampen business activity, but the evidence also tends to show that such changes are
modest. See Luna & Murray, note 32, at 1014, 1017. This is likely especially true as to the
small increase in rate that would be required to make the granting of this credit revenue
neutral. Of course, the greater the size of the credit, the stronger the argument that it
should at most be partially refundable.
184 See State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., note 62.
185 1 thank David Gamage for his astute observation that this credit would be more
effective if refundable.
186 I observe as well that providing a tax credit would not require a two-thirds super-
majority, Cal. Const. art XIIIA §3, the same way that a tax increase would. Given that
California citizens are already liable for the use tax, if this credit spurred any additional
collection of the use tax by multistate corporations then this credit might be revenue neu-
tral-or enhancing-on its own.
187 Cal. Rev. & Tax § 6051 (West 2013) ("For the privilege of selling tangible personal
property at retail a tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers ... Cal. Civ. Code. § 1656.1
(2013) ("It shall be presumed that the parties agreed to the addition of sales tax reimburse-
ment to the sales price of tangible personal property sold at retail to a purchaser if... Sales
tax reimbursement is shown on the sales check or other proof of sale..."). California is
not unique in structuring its RST this way; see, e.g., Indiana, Ind. Code § 6-2.5-2-2(a) (West
2013) ("The state gross retail tax is measured by the gross retail income received by a retail
merchant in a retail unitary and is imposed at seven percent (7%) of that gross retail in-
come."); John L. Mikesell, State Gross Receipts Taxes and the Fundamental Principles of
Tax Policy, 43 St. Tax Notes 615, 615 (Mar. 5, 2007) ("Some retail sales taxes are legally
described as gross receipts taxes, including those in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
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could be a provision in the CIT that provides an income tax credit to
any firm that has paid its gross receipts tax obligation (that is, the RST
passed on to consumers).
This structure by itself might be argued to violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause because only in-state California firms collect the
RST. But I do not think this argument is correct. Most obviously, any
argument that this credit is infirm is likely to throw into doubt the
many other credits found in the CIT that reward corporations for tak-
ing actions in-state that the state desires.188 Indeed, this credit would
be less problematic than some of these other tax credits because this
RST credit would also be available to any firm that collects the use tax
wherever its operations. The use tax is imposed on all consumers at
the same rate as the sales tax, but a consumer who has paid the sales
tax need not also pay the use tax. Retailers must collect the use tax
unless the transaction is exempt or the Quill rule bars a state from
imposing the collection obligation. Thus out-of-state corporations
that collect the use tax will be able to get the credit just like in-state
corporations, and some in-state corporations that do not collect the
RST (say a service corporation) will also not be able to get the CIT
credit.
Nevertheless, an out-of-state corporation without physical presence
that does not collect use tax because of Quill will not be able to get
the credit, and this arguably violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
because the Constitution was found to protect the corporation from
the obligation that spurs the credit. Going back to the nature of cred-
its, however, a firm does not have to invest in an enterprise zone just
like certain firms do not need to collect the RST, but, should they do
so, then the states can reward them.189 Furthermore, states providing
and Wisconsin."). In another odd twist, the use tax is levied on all use of tangible personal
property, Cal. Rev. & Tax § 6201 (West 2013), but there is a credit for the sales tax. Cal.
Rev. & Tax § 6401 (West 2013). I note the additional statutory contortions because adding
a credit as appropriately due for collection of RST to the CIT would hardly be a blight on
an austere and logical statutory scheme.
188 For example, California's research credit applies only to research done in California.
Cal. Rev. & Tax § 23609(c)(2). A recent California appellate case struck down California's
exclusion of gain on the sale of qualified small business stock if the gain were reinvested in
another qualified small business on dormant commerce clause grounds because the bene-
fits of the provision were limited to California investments. Cutler v. Franchise Tax Board,
208 Cal. App. 4th 1247 (2012); see also Cal. Rev. & Tax § 18152.5(d)(1)(C)("The term
'qualified small business' means .... [a]t least 80 percent of the corporation's payroll, as
measured by total dollar value, is attributable to employment located within California.").
It has already been noted that the chain of reasoning that struck down the small business
stock exclusion could also lead to striking down many other credits, including the research
and development credit. Kathleen K. Wright, California Resurrects Retroactive Tax Rem-
edies, 67 St. Tax Notes 263, 269 (Jan. 28, 2013).
189 Cf. Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation 4-102 to4-104 (3rd ed.
2008).
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the RST credit would not be levying a higher CIT on such an out-of-
state corporation so long as the RST collection credit is designed in a
way that tries to compensate collecting corporations for the fact that
they pay additional tax to the extent the incidence of the gross re-
ceipts tax/RST actually falls on them.190
2. Second Step: Reduce the CIT Burden on Firms that Do Not and
Ought Not Collect the RST
But what of a manufacturing firm that pays the CIT, but does not
collect the RST, and is therefore ineligible for the credit? Remember,
about one-third of the CIT is paid by manufacturing firms. As a com-
plement to the RST, the CIT has little role in taxing such firms, al-
though, again, it may have an important role along other dimensions,
such as regulation. It turns out that federal and state governments
already shower manufacturing firms with special deductions meant to
incentivize certain activities and thus this initiative has largely been
undertaken. 191 Indeed, the shift in the CIT towards SSF is another big
step towards reducing the CIT burden on payroll and land intensive
industries. And thus it is already the case that the CIT is receding in
importance as to firms that we are not concerned about in the context
of improving the RST.
VI. CONCLUSION: A HOUSECALL FROM DR. PANGLOSS?
At the beginning of this Article, I observed that in thinking about
state tax policy we are constrained by poor policies at multiple levels
that are best thought of as fixed objects. 192 Compared to property tax
reform and fundamental RST reform, state CITs are rather malleable.
Indeed, the attention they have received seems out of proportion both
to their fiscal importance and theoretical soundness. Though ad hoc, I
have argued that many of these changes have been for the better. Be-
cause change to the CIT is possible, we should consider how best to
proceed.
190 It is worth noting that the only case where the Supreme Court accepted the so-called
"complementary tax doctrine," that is, out-of-staters could be charged a different compen-
sating tax, is in connection with sales and use taxes. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc.,
300 U.S. 577 (1937). Thus, the more the CIT functions as a true complement to the RST,
the less vulnerable it ought to be to a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. See David
Gamage & Devin Hickman, A Way Forward for State Taxation of E-Commerce, 92 B.U.L.
Rev. 483, 496 (2012) (arguing that forcing out-of-state firms to collect the use tax does not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause so long as the collecting firms are compensated).
191 See, e.g., Gravelle & Hungerford, note 133, at 30-31.
192 Cf. Kirk J. Stark, Houdini Tax Reform: Can California Escape its Fiscal Strait-
jacket?, California Policy Options 1, 171 (2011) (describing obstacles to tax reform in
California).
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The key question I addressed is: Do all these changes indicate a
new justification for the state CIT? I believe that the answer is yes.
The new justification for the CIT is that it is a fallback consumption
tax given the poor design of state RSTs.
The follow-up question I addressed is: Does this new rationale indi-
cate design features that should be considered going forward? Again,
I think the answer is yes. States should pursue SSF apportionment
and should interpret the nexus for state CIT purposes broadly-and
Congress ought not to interfere. States should also look at ways of
broadening the CIT base to include large firms that do not do business
in the corporate form.
And this suggests a different note on which to end this Article.
Consistent with the best theories of tax assignment, most local govern-
ments still fund themselves primarily with property taxes and fees.
Furthermore, states generally try to use broader-based sales and in-
come taxes to ease the inequities caused by local reliance on the prop-
erty tax. State tax systems are broadly similar to each other, in part
thanks to initiatives on uniform laws. State-level income taxes also
generally conform to the federal income tax-all saving considerable
transaction costs. Ultimately, states and localities compete with each
other on the basis of taxes and services, much as theories of fiscal
federalism would desire. And, in the end, states are bound by bal-
anced budget constraints that force them to internalize the conse-
quences of their decisions. Although I think it would truly be
Panglossian to see this system as purely positive in theory or prac-
tice,193 the actual results are fairly impressive 194-certainly much
more impressive than one might have thought if one took the perspec-
tive that the overall system had to have been planned carefully if it
was to work.
Yet there has been no plan. For instance, particular events in the
nineteenth century resulted in state balanced budget rules that are
193 Here is an example that borders on the Panglossian. John Joseph Wallis & Barry R.
Weingast, Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions: State Debt Limitations, the Structure of
State and Local Governments, and the Finance of American Infrastructure, in Fiscal Chal-
lenges: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Budget Policy 331, 336 (Elizabeth Garret, Eliza-
beth Grady & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008) ("The United States has some of the best
infrastructure in the world, much of it provided by state and local governments, most of it
financed by government borrowing, and a long history of fiscal probity. Despite those
facts, American voters and scholars still worry that state and local governments fail to play
by the rules they themselves establish."). As I indicate in the text, I think there is clearly
something to this positive spin given to the apparent chaos of American federalism, though
I think the critiques are also quite telling. On infrastructure finance, see, e.g., "the Report
Card for America's Infrastructure," available at http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/
(American Society of Civil Engineers gives American infrastructure a "D").
194 Cf. Gruber, note 108, at 274 ("The nature of fiscal federalism in the United is largely
consistent with [the] prediction [of the Tiebout model/optimal fiscal federalism].").
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now believed to roughly conform to what the theory of fiscal federal-
ism would indicate is appropriate. Starting in the 1970's, school fi-
nance equity lawsuits, often based on language about education from
nineteenth century state constitutions, compelled states to use broader
resources on equalization. 195 And so too, perhaps, the story of the
RST and the CIT is another example of contingent events aligning in
a manner that yields a serviceable, if theoretically ugly, result. Thus,
speaking crudely, progressive politics in the early twentieth century
resulted in the CIT, then the Great Depression and the structure of
the economy in the 1930's resulted in RSTs that taxed only tangible
sales, and now dubious arguments for economic development in the
last decades have spurred the shift to the SSF. But the sales factor for
purposes of the CIT has been defined broadly since its inception when
services and intangibles were less important, and thus this accidental
shift to the sales factor enables a fix to the RST. The goal of this
Article has been to note this trend and to try to nudge states to con-
sciously move to make this shift more efficacious. We do not live in
the best of all possible worlds, but we can make our gardens just a
little better.196
195 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295-98 (NJ 1973).
196 I observe that, should all (or most) states move to a large business entity income tax
based on SSF, then those same states could move to reduce pyramiding by allowing for
immediate deduction of all business inputs. Also, more controversially, they could disal-
low deductions for wages on the theory that these payments should not be taken out of the
consumption tax base. This final step would transform the new CIT into a subtraction-
method VAT, much like what the California Commission for the Twenty-First Century
Economy envisioned its Business Net Receipts Tax ("BNRT") would be, see Report of the
Comm'n on the 21stCentury Economy 1, 44 (2009), available at www.cote.ca.gov/docu-
ments/reports/documents/commission-on-the_21stcentury-EconomyFinalReport.pdf.,
and much like other current state business taxes, like Texas's Margin Tax, are supposed to
operate, at least roughly. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 171.101(a) (West 2012) (one calculation of
taxable margin consists of revenues minus the costs of goods sold). This is not an ideal
form of VAT, but note that many of the critiques of California's proposed BNRT involved
the fact that other states did not have a similar tax whereas the new CIT would, in this
scenario, be characterized by considerable national uniformity. See Stark, note 192, at 18-
20.
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